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BERKSHIRE’S BLEMISHES:
LESSONS FOR BUFFETT’S SUCCESSORS, PEERS,
AND POLICY
Lawrence A. Cunningham*
Berkshire Hathaway’s unique managerial model is lauded for its
great value; this article highlights its costs. Most costs stem from the
same features that yield such great value, which boil down, ironically,
to Berkshire trying to be something it isn’t: it is a massive industrial
conglomerate run as an old-fashioned investment partnership. An
advisory board gives unchecked power to a single manager (Warren
Buffett); Buffett makes huge capital allocations and pivotal executive
hiring-and-firing decisions with modest investigation and scant
oversight; Berkshire’s autonomous and decentralized structure grants
operating managers enormous discretion with limited second-guessing;
its trust-based culture relies on a cultivated vision of integrity more
than internal controls; and its thrifty anti-bureaucracy means no
central departments, such as public relations or general counsel.
Delineating the visible costs of Berkshire’s model confirms the
desirability of tolerating many of them, given the value concurrently
generated, but also reveals ways to improve the model—a few while
Buffett is at the helm but mostly for successors. Current reform
suggestions include hiring a full-time public relations professional at
headquarters and more systematically developing senior executives;
suggestions for future reform include enhanced subsidiary compliance
resources and separating the identity and personal opinions of top
executives from the corporation and its official policy.

* © 2016. All Rights Reserved by Lawrence A. Cunningham, Henry St. George Tucker
III Research Professor, George Washington University. Thanks for comments to
Stephanie Cuba, Anupreeta Das, Chris Goulakos, Brian Tayan and Jason Zweig; for
research assistance to Gia Arney; and to the audience at the Museum of American
Finance where I delivered this paper as the keynote address for its symposium on the
50th Anniversary of Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway.
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Besides helping Berkshire, the review and suggestions will help
managers of other companies inspired by Buffett’s unique managerial
model and policymakers who should study it. Implications for peers and
policymakers include highlighting flexibility in corporate governance,
the efficacy of the conglomerate form, and especially the value of
strategies that produce long-term thinking among shareholders and
managers alike.
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“We would rather suffer the visible costs of a few bad decisions
than incur the many invisible costs that come from decisions made too
slowly— or not at all—because of a stifling bureaucracy.”
—Warren Buffett

I.

INTRODUCTION

This article examines the visible costs of Berkshire Hathaway’s
unique managerial model, highlighting the lessons for Berkshire and the
implications for peers and policymakers. Most such costs derive from
the same features that have produced substantial value at Berkshire,
which ironically are due to Berkshire trying to be something it is not:
Warren Buffett’s giant industrial conglomerate is organized and
operated as if it were still the old-fashioned investment partnership of
its early years. Costs arise from the empowerment of a single individual
to make multi-billion dollar decisions with scant oversight, devolution
of operating decisions to disparate individuals running its scores of
diverse subsidiaries, and a culture based on a cultivated sense of
integrity rather than conventional internal controls. While the net
benefits are vast, tallying the costs illuminates how the model might be
improved, especially after Buffett leaves the scene in the next decade
or so.
The most visible—and measurable—costs of the Berkshire model
appear in capital allocation, principally acquisitions and investments.
Buffett relies on himself in making these decisions, without board or
executive input or oversight. While most such decisions have
succeeded, many spectacularly so, some bloopers have appeared, the
best-known being Dexter Shoe and Gen Re. The costs of error from
such self-reliance could readily be mitigated by broader distribution of
decision-making power. Buffett does so by periodically consulting vice
chairman Charles Munger. Yet since the net costs of this approach have
been modest, thanks to Buffett’s acumen and stature, there is no reason
for reform while Buffett is at the helm. But some additional powersharing and oversight would be appropriate for his successors, as
Berkshire’s succession plan contemplates.
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The more dramatic costs of the Berkshire model arise from
executive departures and succession at the subsidiaries. While most
Berkshire managers have excelled and the company generally retains
managers for lengthy tenures, there are exceptions that become costly
because they suggest crisis. The stakes have been particularly high on
the occasions involving executives considered likely successors to
Buffett, such as David Sokol and Richard Santulli. The drama of
Berkshire executive shuffles arises in part from Buffett being the
company’s sole decision-maker, but it is magnified by Berkshire’s lack
of formal vetting, training, grooming, and talent review protocols. This
problem should be remedied now, while Buffett is at the helm, and there
is evidence of increased coordination and discussion among Berkshire
subsidiary CEOs, which should intensify as Berkshire moves beyond
Buffett.
Berkshire’s decentralized structure produces a third category of
costs, those inflicted on customers or employees. At a sprawling
business organization with hundreds of units and hundreds of thousands
of employees, such externalities are inevitable. Known historical
examples at specific Berkshire subsidiaries include questionable
practices of certain distributors of Kirby vacuums and inhumane
conditions at Fruit of the Loom’s overseas manufacturing facilities.
More generally, consumer advocates critique some products that
Berkshire companies and investees market—such as See’s candies,
Coca-Cola’s carbonated beverages, and Kraft’s processed foods.1 Labor
advocates challenge treatment of the workforce by co-investors,
especially by 3G, the Brazilian private equity firm with which Berkshire
has co-invested in H. J. Heinz and Kraft. While such costs are tolerable
with Buffett at the helm, and the benefits of decentralization should be
sustained once he’s gone, Berkshire will need to invest more resources
in conglomerate-wide internal control and reporting in the coming
years.

See, e.g., Zachary Tracer, Kraft a Menu at the Buffett Buffet With Warren’s
Latest
Deal,
BLOOMBERG
BUSINESS,
March
25,
2015,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-25/kraft-a-menu-at-the-buffettbuffet-with-warren-s-latest-deal [http://perma.cc/LQU3-DJPA]; Kyle Stock, Warren
Buffett is Bad for Your Health, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS, March 25, 2015,
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-25/warren-buffett-is-bad-for-yourhealth [http://perma.cc/5658-HSQN].
1
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Subtler costs arise from Berkshire’s zealous thriftiness that leave it
without a centralized communications or public relations department.
Given Berkshire’s scale and reach, however, along with relatively
opaque disclosure about many operations, it attracts investigative
journalists targeting subsidiaries for critical exposure and sometimes
political or legal advantage. Subsidiaries as diverse as National
Indemnity and Clayton Homes appeared flatfooted as targets of
corporate exposés, in part because of Berkshire’s lack of a centralized
communications or public relations department.2 Respecting as
laudable the thrifty anti-bureaucratic impulse, the company would
nevertheless do well now to hire a professional to handle Berkshire’s
overall public relations, for both parent-level communications and to
coordinate that of subsidiaries.
The most significant historical cost of the Berkshire model has been
widespread treatment of Berkshire as Buffett’s alter ego, a natural
propensity given his long-time controlling ownership and dominating
leadership. It became a cost, however, as Buffett became outspoken in
offering his personal views on a range of hot topics on which Berkshire
may act differently—or critics so perceive, and charge hypocrisy.
Examples: Buffett urges more progressive taxation while Berkshire
pursues tax-advantaged transactions;3 Buffett criticizes financial
intermediaries while Berkshire’s portfolio holds substantial stakes in
them;4 and Buffett publicly stated his support for the Keystone oil

2

See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Warren Buffett and Wall Street: The Best of
Frenemies, FINANCIAL HISTORY, Fall 2015, at 16, http://www.moaf.org/publicationscollections/financial-historymagazine/115/_res/id=sa_File1/Warren%20Buffett%20and%20Wall%20Street.pdf
[http://perma.cc/497D-DV5Q]; infra text accompanying notes 58–97.
3 See, e.g., Jim Puzzanghera, Burger King, Warren Buffett Under fire for
Canadian
Inversion
Deal,
L.A.
TIMES,
Aug.
26,
2014,
http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-burger-king-tim-hortons-boyctott-warrenbuffett-20140826-story.html [http://perma.cc/PG8B-Y8NP]; infra text accompanying
notes 98–113.
4 See Dale A. Oesterle, Revisiting the Anti-Takeover Fervor of the ‘80s Through
the Letters of Warren Buffett, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 565, 573–77 (1997); see also infra
note 102.
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pipeline despite how it would compete with Berkshire’s BNSF
Railway.5
Although these costs cannot be tackled with Buffett at Berkshire’s
helm, successors can avoid them by reticence—executive behavior that
clearly distinguishes the company from its personnel, including
refraining from offering personal opinions in public debates. Another
cost of this alter ego phenomenon, which has received the greatest
publicity, is the most intractable: concern about the fate of the company,
after the man passes.
To summarize, the principal sources of the costs of Berkshire’s
model are self-reliance, a culture of autonomy and trust,
decentralization, thrift, and alter ego. Resulting costs may be
categorized as the costs of error, crisis, externalities, reputation, and
uncertainty. Corrective measures to enact now are incrementally greater
leadership coordination, increased grooming to minimize the costs of
succession crises, and hiring of a professional public relations expert to
protect reputation. Measures to enact in due course are slightly wider
sharing of decision-making power over capital allocation to neutralize
error risk; modest strengthening of internal reporting controls to police
against externalities; and maintenance of executive reticence on matters
of public policy to avoid the costs of treating Berkshire’s leadership as
synonymous with the company.
The Berkshire model offers lessons for other companies and
policymakers. Given the model’s substantial net success, a fundamental
prescription is to allow corporations broad leeway in governance design
and organizational structure. In their modesty, Berkshire’s specific
blemishes reaffirm the value of such latitude while attesting to the
general appeal of the type—but not the degree—of prevailing
governance regulation or practice. Leading examples are having some
deliberative body such as a board, but accepting the traditional advisory
model rather than insisting on the contemporary monitoring model;
allowing even iconic chief executives significant, if restrained,
autonomy; leaving substantial room for trust as the basis of an

See Stephen Gandel, Warren Buffett: “I Would Have Passed Keystone,”
FORTUNE, Mar. 2, 2015; Jeremy Bowman, Did Obama Just Do Warren Buffett and
Railroad Stocks a Huge Favor? MOTLEY FOOL, Mar. 8, 2015.
5
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organization, complemented by controls tailored to internal needs rather
than imposed by general regulation; and permitting the conglomerate
form of organization to flourish under conditions such as those
Berkshire has nurtured while assuring the capacity for such institutions
to defend themselves against hostile onslaught by corporate raiders or
shareholder activists.
II.

ISSUES AND LESSONS FOR BERKSHIRE

As the ensuing chart tabulates, the following discussion catalogues
the costs of Berkshire’s model as arising from five traits—self-reliance,
autonomy, decentralization, thrift, and alter ego. Each trait’s costs are
presented in the context where they manifest most saliently and are
accompanied by specific illustrations. A prescription concludes each
section, principally discussing whether to adjust the trait now or after
Buffett leaves the scene. In a couple of miscellaneous settings, tolerance
is the best prescription.
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TABLE 1: COSTS OF BERKSHIRE’S BLEMISHES V.
MODEST PRESCRIPTIONS
TRAIT

COST

CONTEXT

EXAMPLES

PRESCRIPTION

A. Self-reliance:
BRK CEO exercises
unbridled discretion

Error Risk

XTRA
Dexter Shoe
Gen Re
TXU

Adjust post-Buffett

B. Autonomy: subsidiary
CEOs in trust-based culture
with hyper-delegation and
one-man
oversight
C. Decentralization: units
operate independently
without central control or
reporting

Crisis

Capital
allocation
(acquisitions
and
investments)
Executive
departures

NetJets
D. Sokol
Ben. Moore
Gen Re

Adjust now

Adjust post-Buffett

D. Thrift:
zealous anti-bureaucracy
means no central
departments, including
public relations

Reputation
Risk

Investigative
journalists
attack
flatfooted
Goliath

Kirby
Company
Fruit of the
Loom
3G
Heinz/Kraft
Acme Brick
NICO
Clayton
Homes
NV Energy

E. Alter Ego:
widespread view of Buffett
and Berkshire as
synonymous

Perceived
hypocrisy

Public
debates

Tax policy

Adjust post-Buffett

Externalities Impositions
on
customers/
workers

Adjust now

Financial
intermediaries

Uncertainty
Succession
planning

F. Miscellaneous

Opportunity
costs
False
expectations

Listed
family
businesses
Executive
tenure
myth

Clayton
Homes
Actual
departures

Tolerate
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A. Error Risks of Self-Reliance in Capital Allocation
Buffett calls all parent-level shots at Berkshire, on his own, with
limited investigation and no oversight, especially concerning
acquisitions and investments. Unlike most sizable public companies,
Berkshire relies on neither its board of directors nor senior executives
to approve acquisitions; nor does it utilize outside advisors to vet deals.
Buffett explains his general philosophy to the board but rarely seeks its
advance approval; he occasionally consults with vice chairman Charles
Munger ahead of time, but not always and he does not always heed
Munger’s counsel.6 Berkshire rarely uses business brokers or
investment bankers to find acquisition targets, but rather relies on an
informal network of friends and business associates.7 Most suggestions
work out well, but not all, entailing some costs of error.
One of Berkshire’s most unusual acquisitions occurred in 2001,
when Buffett’s friend, Julian Robertson, founder of the preeminent
Tiger Fund, signaled to Buffett his willingness to sell a large stake in
XTRA, the truck leasing company.8 Buffett upped the ante, proposing
to XTRA’s board the making of a tender offer to its shareholders, which
it endorsed, and Berkshire soon closed the deal. Contrary to Berkshire’s
usual practice of maintaining both management and operations after an
acquisition, within three years, XTRA’s replaced its CEO, relocated its
headquarters, and divested a large part of its asset base.9 While such
drastic steps are commonly part of the plan of many corporate
acquisitions, they are avoided under the Berkshire model. So when such
steps are taken at Berkshire—in this case to reduce overhead, improve
asset utilization, and boost profits—they are anomalies that can prove
costly. Their origin is in the informality of Berkshire acquisitions,

6 See LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, BERKSHIRE BEYOND BUFFETT: THE ENDURING
VALUE OF VALUES 213 (2014) [hereinafter CUNNINGHAM, BERKSHIRE BEYOND
BUFFETT]; Lawrence A. Cunningham, Berkshire’s Disintermediation: Buffett’s New
Managerial Model, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 509, 516 (2015).
7 See CUNNINGHAM, BERKSHIRE BEYOND BUFFETT, supra note 6, at 213.
8 Letter from Warren Buffett to Shareholders 2001 (Feb. 28, 2002),
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2001pdf.pdf
[http://perma.cc/T9GZ9VMZ].
9 See CUNNINGHAM, BERKSHIRE BEYOND BUFFETT, supra note 6, at 212.
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especially spontaneously acting on tips by friends and associates and
conducting scant due diligence.
While XTRA turned out to be a profitable acquisition, another
unusual deal posed disastrous financial results: Berkshire’s 1993
acquisition of Dexter Shoe. Berkshire paid $443 million—all in
Berkshire stock—for the dying New England shoemaker.10 The
company had been a dynamo, producing millions of shoes in local
factories annually. Dexter maintained production in the United States,
paying higher wages than rivals and outdid imports from low-wage
countries in terms of quality and style.
Despite positive traits, Dexter had a big latent negative:
manufacturing costs in the U.S. were ten times those in China.11
Eventually, rivals produced shoes as good as Dexter’s but at one-tenth
the cost. By 2007, Buffett confessed that acquiring Dexter was the worst
deal he ever made, as Berkshire shuttered it.12 The cost was the value
of the Berkshire stock surrendered, by 2015 nearing an eye-popping $6
billion, teaching the perils of using a high quality stock like Berkshire
to acquire businesses.
Buffett alone made the mistake—without input from the Berkshire
board or his inner circle. One lesson: even the greatest investors and
decision makers make costly mistakes. Buffett is aware of this, of
course, which is why he often vets proposals with Munger. But while
Buffett values Munger’s counsel to veto a deal—earning Munger the
nickname the “Abominable No Man”—Buffett has not always listened,
as the even more costly acquisition of Gen Re attests.
In 1999, Berkshire paid $22 billion for Gen Re—all in Berkshire
stock (the lesson from Dexter to avoid paying in stock did not appear

10 Jonathan Stempel, Buffett Calls Dexter Shoe His Worst Deal Ever, REUTERS
(Feb. 29, 2008), http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/03/01/us-berkshire-buffettfailure-idUSN2921504820080301 [http://perma.cc/A99H-4NHE].
11 See CUNNINGHAM, BERKSHIRE BEYOND BUFFETT, supra note 6, at 29.
12 The real cost was greater than the $443 million purchase price since it was paid
in Berkshire stock. The stock paid represented 1.6 percent of Berkshire, which in 2007
would have been worth $3.5 billion.
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until 2007).13 Buffett and Munger knew that Gen Re, a large reinsurer,
maintained a significant derivatives business that posed considerable
risk. While Munger suggested avoiding the deal, Buffett figured he
would direct managers to close that business unit promptly after closing
the deal. But once Berkshire acquired Gen Re, the managers did not do
so and, consistent with Buffett’s hands-off approach, he did not push
them (such reluctance underscores how unusual the post-acquisition
shuffles at XTRA were).14
Besides patent problems of the derivatives business, more latent
challenges also beset Gen Re’s wider operations. Buffett had known
Ronald Ferguson, Gen Re’s chief executive, for many years, and
apparently relied heavily Ferguson’s personal knowledge and
experience. What neither Buffett nor Ferguson knew, however, was that
Gen Re’s underwriting discipline and reserving had slipped.15 It had
under-reserved for risks it covered, which underwriters translated into
low prices on subsequent policies. The firm pursued business it should
have rejected, including undue concentration in particular risks. From
1999 to 2001, Gen Re incurred underwriting losses totaling $6.1 billion;
unwinding the derivatives business was both costly and protracted,
causing Buffett angst for many years.16

13 Press Release, Berkshire Hathaway Inc. and General Re Corporation to Merge
(June
19,
1998),
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/news/jun1998.html
[http://perma.cc/C7V7-8GJW].
14 WARREN E. BUFFETT & LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, THE ESSAYS OF WARREN
BUFFETT: LESSONS FOR CORPORATE AMERICA 151, 155–157 (4th ed. 2016) [hereinafter
THE ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETT].
15 Oversight may have been lax too, as a subsequent criminal case against
Ferguson and other Gen Re executives questioned the legitimacy of a high-level
insurance contract that, prosecutors said, was arranged to facilitate financial fraud by
the counterparty, American International Group (AIG). See Noah A. Gold, Corporate
Criminal Liability: Cooperate, and You Won’t Be Indicted, 8 GEO. L. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y
147, 148–152 (2010). The case led to the resignation of both Ferguson and his successor
Joseph Brandon. Id. In a book I wrote with former AIG chairman Hank Greenberg,
however, we explained why such allegations were without merit and the related
investigations flawed. MAURICE R. GREENBERG & LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, THE
AIG STORY 177–179, 185 (2013).
16 Mark A. Hoffman, Warren Buffett Accepts Blame for General Re’s Poor
Results,
BUSINESS
INSURANCE,
Mar.
2002,
http://www.businessins˚urance.com/article/20020317/ISSUE01/10009254/warrenbuffett-accepts-blame-for-general-res-poor-results
[http://perma.cc/P2X5-ZC4P];
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Berkshire shareholders voted to approve the Gen Re transaction,17 a
vote required because it was structured as a merger, with Berkshire
transferring shares to Gen Re holders— unusual features for a Berkshire
deal, most of which are acquisitions for cash, which do not require
shareholder approval. While shareholder votes can check improvident
deals, the Berkshire-Gen Re merger sailed through. True, shareholders
of many companies often approve improvident mergers due to
ignorance or apathy, but Berkshire shareholders are savvy and seen as
partners. Yet, despite such hallmarks, Berkshire’s shareholders remain
holders of corporate equity, not partners, and are therefore prone to
error. Thus, there is a cost of overstating the significance of Berkshire’s
shareholder body. The shareholders cannot be counted on to veto
improvident deals Buffett proposes.
Munger is not only influential, sometimes vetoing deals, but
deferential, when Buffett wishes to proceed anyway. In 2007, Buffett
invested $2 billion in the debt of a leveraged buyout of Texas electric
utilities. It soon busted amid the financial crisis, costing Berkshire
almost $900 million.18 Reporting this in 2013, Buffett wrote, “Next time
I’ll call Charlie.”19 While investment committees, common at most
businesses even fractions of Berkshire’s size, limit opportunistic capital
allocation, instances like this underscore the cost of a one-man
investment committee.
Buffett understands the appeal and limits of the model and seems to
believe that others besides him can execute it. On the other hand, the
Berkshire succession plan envisions splitting the roles of chief
executive and chief investment officer and the roles of management
from board chairman. Accordingly, the Berkshire succession plan
envisions a somewhat tighter leash on Buffett’s successor—and,
unusually for Berkshire, joins a trendy feature in contemporary
Steve Jordon, General Re is the Key to Berkshire’s Ignition, Underwriting Losses,
OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Apr. 28, 2002, at 1.
17 Press Release, Berkshire Hathaway Inc. and General Re Corporation to Merge
(June
19,
1998)
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/news/jun1998.html
[http://perma.cc/C7V7-8GJW].
18 BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., SHAREHOLDER LETTERS 2013 (2014), p 17.
[https://perma.cc/M94G-YE9F].
19 Id.
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governance of splitting the roles of board chairman and chief
executive.20 That outcome should be continually monitored by
Berkshire’s board, which should be willing to loosen or tighten it, even
if incrementally, as may be indicated by performance from time to
time.21

B. Crisis Costs in Severing Autonomous Executives
The costs of Berkshire’s management structure are most dramatic
when senior executives depart after being ensnared in widelypublicized imbroglios. The problems generally arise, in varying
degrees, from Berkshire’s lack of any formal program of executive
recruiting, vetting, talent review, or succession grooming. Buffett pays
close attention to manager identity when acquiring a company, but then
relies on such managers to appoint successors. At the same time, there
is no middle management, so in modern management parlance, a single
person has some eighty direct reports. The chief costs are from
mistakenly releasing or retaining senior executives in circumstances
that suggest crisis.22
Crisis was the hallmark of a series of executive shuffles at
Berkshire’s NetJets subsidiary, which involved two managers on the
short list of Buffett successors, Richard Santulli and David Sokol.
NetJets, which Santulli founded and led through 2009, is a competitive
and capital intensive business with a unionized employee base.23 Selling
fractional interests in private aircraft to the elite, Santulli conceived of
the business as a luxury brand and operated it accordingly. But the

20

See Thuy-Nega T. Vo, To Be or Not to Be Both CEO and Board Chair, 76
BROOK. L. REV. 65, 73 (2010).
21 For other firms, addressed more fully in Part II below, insisting on a capable
decision maker based on core principles and a proven track record seems imperative
before opting to follow the Berkshire model. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Secret
Sauce of Corporate Leadership, WALL ST. J., (Jan. 25, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/lawrence-a-cunningham-the-secret-sauce-of-corporateleadership-1422231824 [http://perma.cc/UET3-K3C7]. At minimum, they should
embrace the fundamental Berkshire-Buffett tenet of the circle of competence—
allocating capital only to undertakings clearly within the decision maker’s capabilities.
22 In addition to the examples of executive succession amid crisis given in this
section, two others occurred in succession at Gen Re amid questions about the legality
of a high-level insurance contract with AIG. See supra note 15.
23 See CUNNINGHAM, BERKSHIRE BEYOND BUFFETT, supra note 6, at 24, 91–92.
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company struggled and, amid economic adversity following the 2008
financial crisis, Buffett decided to make a change. Why he did so
remains something of a mystery and certainly an anomaly, however, as
Buffett rarely second-guesses managers, especially company founders
like Santulli.
As NetJets’ new CEO, Buffett appointed Sokol, who perceived
NetJets to be bloated and forthwith cut costs aggressively.24 Unionized
employees were furious and a sense of crisis soon engulfed the
company. Why Buffett chose Sokol to run NetJets is also a curiosity.
Sokol was running Berkshire Hathaway’s energy business (then called
Mid-American Energy) and troubleshooting as board chairman at Johns
Manville. Buffett has almost never moved a CEO from one Berkshire
company to another.25 Having the same CEO run two Berkshire
companies was unprecedented. But Buffett had grown to trust Sokol
immensely, having been introduced to him by one of his most intimate
confidants, Walter Scott, a fellow Omaha denizen and Berkshire board
member. Buffett’s faith, however, was misplaced, as Sokol resigned
from all his Berkshire jobs in 2011 after being caught front running—
he was accused of insider trading when he bought stock in a public
company, Lubrizol, ahead of pitching it to Buffett as a Berkshire
acquisition.26
At NetJets, Sokol left behind both his cost-cutting business model
and a successor, Jordan Hansell. Sokol had recruited Hansell from
Berkshire’s energy business, where Hansell had served as general
counsel. NetJets’ pilots loved Santulli and lamented his departure.27
They detested both Sokol and Hansell, and especially their low-cost

24 Geraldine Fabrikant, Potential Successor to Buffett Has Tough Task, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 3, 2009), http://dealbook.nytimes.com//2009/12/04/potential-buffettsuccessor-has-tough-task [http://perma.cc/UER9-FDN8].
25 See Charles Munger, Munger on ‘The Berkshire System,’ in THE ESSAYS OF
WARREN BUFFETT, supra note 14, at 299, 300.
26 See Edward Greene & Olivia Schmid, Duty-Free Insider Trading, 2013 COLUM.
BUS. L. REV. 369, 402.
27 Noah Buhayar & Mary Jane Credeur, Sokol Exit Makes Hansell NetJets CEO
Two Years From Law Firm, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (Apr. 8, 2011),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-04-08/sokol-exit-makes-hansellnetjets-ceo-two-years-after-leaving-iowa-law-firm [http://perma.cc/3FNR-N4SE].
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strategy.28 After Santulli left, management-labor relations deteriorated,
and during 2013–14 the pilots’ union hurled invective at Hansell in
aggressive campaigns from the internet to the Wall Street Journal and
Omaha World Herald.29 Pilots picketed outside Berkshire’s annual
meeting in 2014 and 2015. Amid mounting turmoil, in early 2015,
Hansell resigned and two Santulli-era executives who left from NetJets
earlier that year were recruited back to lead the company.30
From these circumstances, it is tempting to infer that Berkshire’s
acquisition of NetJets was a mistake—and perhaps it belongs in the
prior section’s list of costly acquisitions that are due to Buffett being
Berkshire’s sole decision maker. But it also speaks to the lack of any
formal programs at Berkshire concerning executive recruiting, review,
promotion, or grooming. Sokol had no experience with fractional
aviation or much else relevant to leading NetJets, such as consumer or
union relations. Sokol selected Hansell, a young lawyer at the energy
company, who likewise lacked obviously relevant credentials or
experience.
The Sokol episode also revealed other costs about crisismanagement at Berkshire. After Buffett learned of Sokol’s front
running, he drafted a press release that drew sharp criticism, as it spoke
of “extraordinary” contributions to Berkshire and gave Buffett’s
opinion that Sokol had done nothing illegal.31 Buffett accepted the
criticism32 and then turned the matter over to Berkshire’s board audit

28 Marla Matzer Rose, Union Workers Upset with NetJets, THE COLUMBUS
DISPATCH
(Dec.
9,
2011),
http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/business/2011/12/09/union-workers-upsetwith-netjets.html [http://perma.cc/9CCY-CBWA].
29 See Netjets: Lining CEO Pockets at Expense of Pilot Livelihoods,
GENUINEQS, http://www.genuineqs.com/qs_ads.html [http://perma.cc/5XBT-DL59].
30 Lawrence Cunningham, Was Netjets Purchase a Mistake for Warren Buffett,
BETTY LIU SHOW (June 1, 2015) http://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2015-0601/was-netjets-purchase-a-mistake-for-warren-buffett[http://perma.cc/X4GX9G9U].
31 Press Release, Berkshire Hathaway, Warren E. Buffet, CEO of Berkshire
Hathaway, Announces the Resignation of David L. Sokol (Mar. 30, 2011),
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/news/mar3011.pdf
[http://perma.cc/5GZ2AWQD].
32 Ben Claremon, Notes from the 2011 Berkshire Annual Meeting, THE
INOCULATED
INVESTOR,
http://investing.kuchita.com/wp-
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committee which, with assistance from the law firm Munger Tolles &
Olson, condemned Sokol for violating Berkshire policies.
The executive shuffles at NetJets resembled successive shuffles at
Berkshire’s Benjamin Moore paint manufacturing subsidiary. When
Berkshire acquired it in 2000, Buffett personally promised to continue
its longstanding practice of selling only through independent
distributors, despite the rise of powerful big box retailers such as Home
Depot and Lowe’s.33 By 2012, however, after five years at the helm,
Denis Abrams was replaced for planning to sell paint through such
retailers.34 To find a replacement, Buffett turned to his newly-hired
management assistant, 28-year-old Tracy Britt Cool. The recentlyminted Harvard MBA suggested Robert Merritt, who was installed. But
not two years later, Merritt succumbed to the same fate. Surrounding
both episodes was an atmosphere of crisis, with distributors and other
constituents complaining about the degradation of the company amid
wonder about how such a great company could have taken such a deep
plunge.
The Benjamin Moore departures reveal two variations on the costs
of the Berkshire model as it relates to executive oversight.35 The first
concerns how executives are chosen at Berkshire, which is through
internal and informal means rather than the conventional route of using
an external executive search firm. The second cost of the Benjamin
Moore shuffles concerns the wisdom of Buffett’s commitment to
maintain Benjamin Moore’s old-fashioned distributorship in the first
place.36 Two successive CEOs reflected an intuition about the difficulty
content/uploads/2011/04/2011-Berkshire-Annual-Meeting-Notes.pdf
[http://perma.cc/7TZZ-8L6S].
33 See CUNNINGHAM, BERKSHIRE BEYOND BUFFETT, supra note 6, at 66–67.
34 James Covert, Warren Buffett Fired Benjamin Moore CEO after Bermuda
Cruise, N.Y. POST (June 15, 2012), http://nypost.com/2012/06/15/warren-buffett-firedbenjamin-moore-ceo-after-bermuda-cruise [http://perma.cc/D2BB-T4EY].
35 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, NetJets Shuffle: Costs of Deviations from the
Berkshire
Model,
VALUE
WALK
(June
1,
2015),
http://www.valuewalk.com/2015/06/netjets-ceo-buffett
[http://perma.cc/MCK74DFW].
36 See Steve Jordan, Warren Buffett Says He Replaced Benjamin Moore’s CEO to
Keep
a
Promise,
OMAHA
WORLD-HERALD
(Oct.
16,
2013),
http://www.omaha.com/money/warren-buffett-says-he-replaced-benjamin-moore-sceo-to/article_1c0cb4b7-b2bc-514e-a6a3-ae9697c2ee6f.html [http://perma.cc/HMY8-
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of exclusively selling paint that way given contemporary distribution
channels. Yet they were handcuffed by a commitment made solely by
Buffett, which might have been different if vetted through the Berkshire
board or a committee, an industry consultant, or at least a group of
executives with direct merchandising experience—all of which is alien
to the Berkshire model.
The costs of managerial succession crisis could be mitigated by
modest expansion of corporate bureaucracy (like asking a board
committee’s opinion on executive personnel decisions) or slight
diminution of the trust-based culture (such as conducting background
checks or adding periodic reviews and evaluations). In connection with
Berkshire’s annual meeting in the past few years, I have observed
Berkshire moving in this direction—e.g., regular annual meetings of the
subsidiary CEOs or sometimes joining the board without Buffett’s
presence. Buffett’s successor will likely organize Berkshire into some
dozen divisions whose heads report to headquarters—the model
followed at the Marmon Group, a mini-Berkshire created by the fabled
Pritzer brothers and now a Berkshire subsidiary.37

C. Externalities of Decentralization: Consumers/Workers
Buffett delegates nearly unbridled discretion to subsidiary chief
executives; many of those likewise delegate power to heads of
divisions, and many Berkshire companies are premised on
decentralization.38 The vast majority discharge duties faithfully and
without public incident, in accordance with tenets of Berkshire culture,
including integrity. But there are exceptions or awkward circumstances
that result in mistreatment of consumers and workers.
A chief concern of any decentralized business model is policing
personnel, such as when distributors mistreat dealers39 or when dealers

UU6K]; James Covert, Warren Buffett Cans Benjamin Moore CEO, N.Y. POST (Sept.
27, 2013), http://nypost.com/2013/09/27/warren-buffett-cans-benjamin-moore-ceo
[http://perma.cc/89UJ-EJXZ].
37 See CUNNINGHAM, BERKSHIRE BEYOND BUFFETT, supra note 6, at 167–173.
38 Id.
39 See Lee Howard, Ex-Kirby Employees Can Join Suit, THE DAY (New London,
CT) (Mar. 28, 2012), http://www.theday.com/article/20120328/BIZ02/303289972
[http://perma.cc/2D2G-4B7T].
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use illegal high-pressured sales tactics. At Berkshire’s Scott Fetzer
subsidiary, distributors of Kirby vacuums are autonomous businesses.40
But they also represent the brand and company. In the past, some
violated company policy on proper marketing and employment
practices or even broke consumer protection and fair labor laws.41
Private lawsuits and state enforcement actions resulted.42 In addition to
naming the individual businesses as defendants, these claims often also
allege that Scott Fetzer and, by extension, Berkshire are culpable.43
Such criticisms appear to have been more common in the 1990s, but
they persisted.44
Yet avoiding the costs of legal entanglements and liability would
require withdrawing distributor autonomy. The company would have to
change its entire business model to subject all to comprehensive
training, supervision, and remediation. Such an approach imposes direct
administrative costs as well as unobservable costs to entrepreneurship
and the spirit of ownership that autonomy showers on self-starters. On
balance, the distributorship system’s autonomy value has appeared to
outweigh such costs.
Berkshire’s decentralized structure becomes costlier when
combined with its minimalist approach to internal controls. A dramatic
example was exposed on the floor of the 2009 Berkshire annual meeting
by a former employee of a textile manufacturing operation in Honduras.
In the early 2000s, before Berkshire’s Fruit of the Loom acquired it,
Russell Corporation agreed to produce sportswear adorned with popular
logos, including for college and professional basketball teams.45 But the
goods were made in factories located in China and Honduras that

40

See Joseph P. Cahill, How Kirby Persuades Consumers to Shell Out $1,500 for
Vacuum,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Oct.
4,
1999),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB938991433813279910 [http://perma.cc/V7RR-3M46].
41 See id.; Greg Dawson, Kirby Always Cleaning Up After Others, ORLANDO
SENTINEL
(Aug.
27,
2004),
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2004-0827/news/0408261168_1_kirby-distributors-steve-griffith
[http://perma.cc/P5G33YVM].
42 See Jordan v. Scott Fetzer Co., No. 4:07-CV-80 (CDL), 2009 WL 1885063
(M.D. Ga. June 30, 2009); Howard, supra note 39.
43 See Jordan, 2009 WL 1885063.
44 See Dawson, supra note 41.
45 CUNNINGHAM, BERKSHIRE BEYOND BUFFETT, supra note 6, at 214.
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engaged in objectionable conduct. In China, products were
manufactured in sweatshops that violated international human rights; in
Honduras, company officials boarded-up the plant and ousted workers
in retaliation for unionization efforts.46
Such misbehavior drew the attention of activists across the United
States, including a group of college students who demanded that
universities terminate the agreements.47 It was not until after the 2009
meeting, however, that Buffett and Fruit’s CEO found out about the
problem and Fruit corrected the problems.48 Information must reach
Berkshire headquarters quickly concerning potential subsidiary
violations of company policy or law. But the Berkshire model is
informal, based heavily on one of the few mandates on subsidiary
managers: to report bad news early. Whatever gains arise from such an
approach—a trust-based culture based on integrity—some violations
occur and escape scrutiny, which are clearly a cost of the Berkshire
model.49
More general criticisms against Berkshire concerning employee
relations arose from the partnership deals it has made with 3G, the
Brazilian private equity firm famous for downsizing acquisition targets.
46

Id.
Id.
48 Id. at 214–15.
49 In October 2014, an employee benefits committee of Berkshire’s Acme Brick
subsidiary, which includes Acme CFO Judy Hunter, alleged that a 2010 cutback in the
company match under Acme’s 401(k) plan breached Berkshire’s promises, made in its
2000 acquisition agreement, to make no changes in the plan. Complaint at 29–30,
Hunter v. Berkshire Hathaway Inc., No. 4:14-cv-00663, 2015 WL 5920283, (N.D. Tex.,
Aug. 5, 2015). The committee also alleged violations of pension law and said Berkshire
used “strong-arm tactics against Acme's management” to freeze accrual of pension
benefits. The benefits committee objected, requesting that Acme’s board (which
includes Marc Hamburg, Berkshire CFO) restore the match retroactively, along with
related earnings. When Berkshire responded by offering to either restore the match but
freeze the pension or maintain the match and defer the pension freeze, the committee
called this an “ultimatum” and “strong-arm tactic.” Id. at 1, 17. The Acme benefits
dispute may simply be an internal parent-subsidiary disagreement, pitting Berkshire
CFO Hamburg against Acme CFO Hunter. That would be a likely explanation under
Berkshire’s principle of autonomy, with Buffett letting Hamburg and Hunter duke it
out. On the other hand, Buffett takes a special interest in post-retirement benefit plan
changes—the subject is one of only six points Buffett requests specific updates on from
CEO subsidiaries, an exception to the usual principle of autonomy.
47
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In 2013, Berkshire and 3G jointly acquired H. J. Heinz Company—
which, two years later, merged with Kraft.50 In each case, 3G took
charge of operations and proceeded to make major changes, replacing
top managers and cutting jobs.51 Heinz had conditioned its sale to
Berkshire and 3G on their promise to maintain the company’s presence
and heritage in Pittsburgh, Heinz’s home since its 1869 founding; but
no commitment was made about employees or other constituents (a
contrast to Buffett’s commitment to distributors when acquiring
Benjamin Moore).52
Critics of private equity and fans of Berkshire found the partnership
incongruous, and raised the criticism at Berkshire’s annual meetings.
Buffett said “I tip my hat to what the 3G people have done,” noting that
there were “considerably more people in the job than needed” at the
companies 3G bought.53 He added: “I hope our Berkshire companies
are not being run with more people than they need, either.”54 Buffett did
not directly address the contrast between Berkshire’s own style and that
of 3G or private equity generally, leaving many dissatisfied and
sustaining rather than quelling perceived hypocrisy.55 After all,
50 Press Release, Berkshire Hathaway, H.J. Heinz Company Enters Into
Agreement to Be Acquired by Berkshire Hathaway and 3G Capital (Feb. 14, 2013),
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/news/feb1413.pdf
[http://perma.cc/6DWEBNM6]; Press Release, H.J. Heinz, H.J. Heinz Company and Kraft Foods Group Sign
Definitive Merger Agreement to Form The Kraft Heinz Company (Mar. 25, 2015),
http://news.heinz.com/press-release/finance/hj-heinz-company-and-kraft-foods-groupsign-definitive-merger-agreement-form-k [http://perma.cc/73QR-MFQW].
51 See Annie Gasparo, Three More Longtime Executives Leaving Heinz, WALL ST.
J.
(Jan.
13,
2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304049704579318663756827846
[http://perma.cc/4YTQ-X3SJ].
52 See Press Release, Berkshire Hathaway, supra note 50; see also supra note 36
and accompanying text.
53 Stephen Foley, Warren Buffett Forced to Defend Relationship with Brazil’s 3G
Capital, FINANCIAL TIMES (May 3, 2015), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9a8c39f0f19f-11e4-88b0-00144feab7de.html#axzz3s9zwIYi4 [http://perma.cc/RR3B-6NDN].
54 Id.
55 For additional discussion of accusations of hypocrisy as a Berkshire blemish,
see infra text accompanying notes 98–110. In the case of co-investing with 3G, another
rationale might have explained the difference between Berkshire’s own companies and
those in which it co-invests, whether with 3G or in the open stock market. Berkshire
companies define Berkshire culture and related actions are taken entirely in the
Berkshire name. The 3G companies are investments, though large ones, with 3G in
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Berkshire never buys a company knowing of a high headcount ready to
be reduced.
Berkshire also faces criticism for participating in the purchase of
Kraft, famous as a purveyor of processed and unhealthy foods. Critics
likewise question Berkshire investments in other unhealthy consumer
products, including candies, carbonated soda, and ice cream.56 On the
other hand, Buffett and Munger have passed on economically valuable
opportunities when bothered by a consumer product, such as tobacco
companies.57 But if socially responsible investing were a top priority
for Berkshire, then a diverse and informed investment committee would
be in charge of decisions rather than a single capital allocator.

D. Reputation Risks of Skimping on Public Relations
Berkshire is unusual in corporate America for not having a
substantial professional communications staff or platoon of lobbyists.58
For years, Buffett has boasted about this form of thrift, emphasizing that
he writes his own letters and taking pride in presiding over Berkshire’s
annual shareholders’ meeting where he and Munger respond to
questions for six hours.59 Nor does Berkshire host analyst conference

charge and related actions taken in its name. If 3G’s downsizing hurt those companies,
Berkshire could withdraw from the investment; if they help, Berkshire can continue or
even acquire full ownership from 3G.
But besides not being how Buffett explained it, there are costs to such a partnership
approach. For one, it relies on a distinction between abstaining from making layoffs
directly and financing them for indirect profit. Foley, supra note 53. (“If 3G destroys
rather than improves Heinz/Kraft, then Berkshire can sell, without violating any
principle, but if 3G improves the investee to Berkshire standards, it can acquire the
whole. 3G does the work of both getting the deal and making the changes, while
Berkshire has an option on the upside, both economic and cultural.”).
56 See Tracer, supra note 1; Stock, supra note 1. For that matter, advocates of a
host of causes could challenge innumerable Berkshire interests, ranging from
environmentalists against coal-fired power plants to human rights advocates boycotting
Israeli companies for the country’s treatment of Palestinians.
57 This assertion is based on private correspondence in the author’s files, which
have been verified by editors of the Columbia Business Law Review.
58 An entire academic and professional field is devoted to the topic. See, e.g., JOEP
CORNELISSEN, CORPORATE COMMUNICATION: A GUIDE TO THEORY AND PRACTICE (3d
ed. 2011); PAUL A. ARGENTI, CORPORATE COMMUNICATION (6th ed. 2012).
59 E.g., ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETT, supra note 14, at 34–35 (owner-related
business principle number 12), 80
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calls or participate in the process of generating earnings guidance.
Buffett promises the subsidiaries freedom from such pressure too,
whether it is the analysts inquiring about earnings or the press probing
corporate affairs.
Yet the subsidiaries engage in competitive markets with pressures
from rivals, media, and political foes. Berkshire’s most important
business historically has been insurance, an industry central to the
functioning of the American economy, and Berkshire’s most substantial
investments have been in the financial sector.60 Among other Berkshire
subsidiaries, Clayton Homes is a significant supplier of low-income
housing while Berkshire Hathaway Energy is a force in its industry with
an influential voice in the evolution of related national policy. While
certain Berkshire subsidiaries maintain public relations specialists or
lobbyists, most do not and there is no centralized function for such
services. Whether merely a product of image envy in high profile
businesses or something more substantive, the costs of corporate
exposés can be mitigated by greater coordination and formalization of
the public relations function.
One such exposé attacked Berkshire’s practice of generating
substantial investable funds from insurance float.61 Insurance float
refers to funds that arise from the fact that policy premiums are paid up
front while claims need only be paid, if at all, much later. Buffett
frequently describes the appeal of such leverage, explaining that
Berkshire is often paid to hold such money—so long as risks are
properly priced.62 Buffett thus stresses the relative cost of float, noting
the importance of disciplined underwriting. But a reporter turned the
strategy around on Berkshire, portraying the company’s approach as
giving insurance personnel perverse incentives to do everything in their
power to avoid or delay paying legitimate claims—including acting in
bad faith.

60

See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
Mark Greenblatt, Berkshire Hathaway Subsidiaries Deny, Delay Asbestos,
Hazard
Claims,
Suits
Insiders
Allege,
SCRIPPS
(Oct.
6,
2013),
http://www.abcactionnews.com/news/local-news/i-team-investigates/berkshirehathaway-subsidiaries-deny-delay-asbestos-hazard-claims-suits-insidersallege1381113034234 [http://perma.cc/XL8Q-HD75] [hereinafter Greenblatt].
62 See, e.g., ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETT, supra note 14, at 32, 295, 299, 302.
61
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The focus of the October 2013 exposé, by Mark Greenblatt of
Scripps, was National Indemnity Company’s specialty business in
retroactively reinsuring long-tail asbestos and environmental risks,
giving a dozen illustrations from the thousands of policies it wrote.63
The illustrations involved legal disputes among policyholders,
corporate defendants, the original insurer, and Berkshire’s companies.
The piece spotlighted lawsuits charging bad faith in payment delays or
denials, including lawsuits by policyholders against the ceding insurers
under the original insurance policies or against NICO alleging wrongful
interference with those policies.64 The story quoted aspersions from
claimants, their lawyers, and insurance industry executives, blaming
Berkshire’s float philosophy for the problems.65
While Greenblatt had reached out to Berkshire and NICO personnel
for comment, the recipients did not grant interviews and time
constraints made them unable to respond to every written question he
posed.66 Within days of publication, Berkshire emailed Greenblatt to
explain various inaccuracies in the story but, shortly thereafter, Scripps
emailed Berkshire to say it stood by it.67 So two weeks later, Berkshire
publicized a rebuttal, asserting “bias and lack of professionalism” in the
report.68 Examples: the piece wrongly suggested Berkshire controlled

63

Greenblatt, supra note 61.
Id.
65 Id. (Greenblatt interviewed me for the story too, and correctly quoted me as
countering as follows:
George Washington University law professor Lawrence Cunningham cautions that float
is an “inherent feature” of insurance, and it’s not unusual to see lawsuits in which
policyholders or claimants say an insurer or claims administrator acted in bad faith by
delaying payment.
Cunningham, who is also a Berkshire shareholder and has edited several editions of
“The Essays of Warren Buffett,” said Berkshire corporate culture rests on “unwavering
commitment to integrity.”
He said it would be “antithetical for the company to jeopardize that reputation by
wrongfully delaying or denying claims or acting in any way inconsistent with faithful
administration and payment of claims.”)
66 Interested readers can find the email queries at the following link:
http://media2.scrippsnationalnews.com/shns/Risky_Business/Berkshire_emails/index.
html [perma.cc/74DR-U2JQ].
67 Press
Release, Berkshire
Hathaway Inc., (Oct. 31, 2013),
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/news/Oct3113.pdf [http://perma.cc/HT42-VU6J].
68 Id.
64
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the defense of an asbestos case when the corporate defendant did,
incorrectly insinuated that Berkshire unreasonably resists settling cases
by focusing on 100% of the amount a plaintiff sought rather than
Berkshire’s fractional share among multiple defendants, and credited
critical comments of an insurance claims executive without
appreciating potential bias from his involvement in disputes with
Berkshire.69
Despite Berkshire’s refutation, such allegations reach the public and
resonate with it. It is one way corporate reputations are shaped. And the
story continued to have legs. In January 2014, a lawyer from K&L
Gates collated the cases in a presentation to the American Bar
Association.70 It is not obvious that Berkshire would have done better
with a more traditional public relations department. After all, other
insurers such as AIG have also been accused of slow-pay and no-pay
practices.71
But the interaction between Greenblatt and the company was partial,
as the Berkshire executives reached by Greenblatt regarded their
insurance business duties as more important than complete engagement
with the reporter. A full-time professional who makes such engagement
a top priority would have formulated a comprehensive assessment
ahead of publication, contributing to shaping the original story. That

69 Id. Berkshire stressed that its payments in this business for claims and claimsexpenses exceeded $2.4 billion annually and $20 billion cumulatively. The press release
references honoring its multi-pronged duties to policyholders, insurers and reinsurers
for which it manages claims, regulators, and shareholders “who expect us to operate
well above any minimum standards of practice for our business.” Berkshire also noted
winning respect from all such constituencies, and awards from peers and industry trade
groups. Acknowledging that the run-off and legacy areas involve complex contested
claims, Berkshire said these could not be reduced to sound bites though the piece had
tried to do just that. Berkshire stressed that though it disfavors public comments on
pending cases, it felt constrained to do so to defend against a report that seemed
calculated to influence those cases.
70 John Sylvester, Policyholder Litigation Involving Claims Handling by Resolute
Management Inc., Presentation to the American Bar Association (Jan. 2014).
71 See, e.g., Dean Starkman, AIG's Other Reputation; Some Customers Say the
Insurance Giant Is Too Reluctant to Pay Up, WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2005),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/08/20/AR2005082000179.html.
[http://perma.cc/V4AFW36K].
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preparation would have likely led to a better outcome for Berkshire than
the thrust and parry that now defines the public record. Berkshire acts
as if it is small, but it is a Goliath to reporters and readers alike.
Berkshire and several of its subsidiaries often also make for good
political targets, as evidenced by a campaign launched against Clayton
Homes on April 3, 2015 by Daniel Wagner and Mike Baker.72 Writing
a piece sponsored by the Center for Public Integrity in the Seattle Times,
they alleged that Clayton’s sales team channeled buyers into dubious
mortgages: customers were offered few or no alternative financing
options, terms were seductive (including low down-payment
requirements), defaults and foreclosures were high, and collection
practices were aggressive, the authors asserted.73
Clayton promptly issued a response disagreeing with every negative
assertion in the piece.74 It stressed its policies of customer protection
while acknowledging that, in a minority of cases such as the ones the
writers portrayed, customers facing periodic life challenges have
difficulty repaying loans and may face foreclosure.75 The authors
responded with a point-by-point rebuttal.76 At the Berkshire annual
shareholders’ meeting five weeks later, Buffett also repudiated the

72 Daniel Wagner & Mike Baker, Warren Buffett’s Mobile Home Empire Preys
on the Poor, THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, (Apr. 6, 2015, 8:57 PM),
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2015/04/03/17024/warren-buffetts-mobile-homeempire-preys-poor [http://perma.cc/4FHN-CXFS].
73 Id. The piece called out its own key findings about Clayton Homes: using
multiple corporate names to make buyers believe they are shopping around; lending at
rates exceeding fifteen percent and adding significant fees; customers complaining of
deception and predation via changes, pressure, and fees; and two former dealers saying
headquarters pressured them into channeling customers to borrow from Clayton despite
these problems.
74 Clayton Homes Statement on Mobile-Home Buyer Investigation, OMAHA
WORLD HERALD (Apr. 3, 2015), http://www.omaha.com/clayton-homes-statement-onmobile-home-buyer-investigation/article_7052e0c4-da3b-11e4-8abd5f0b53380837.htmlda3b-11e4-8abd-5f0b53380837.html
[http://perma.cc/HC9L64DP].
75 Id.
76 Daniel Wagner & Mike Baker, A Look at Berkshire Hathaway's Response to
‘Mobile Home Trap’ Investigation, THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY (Apr. 7, 2015,
9:12
AM),
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2015/04/06/17081/look-berkshirehathaways-response-mobile-home-trap-investigation. [http://perma.cc/Y72J-VUYX].
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piece and, again, one of the writers responded with continued
skepticism.77
The real reasons behind the piece later emerged to be more political
than first appeared. At the time of the report, Congress had begun
debating regulations applicable to manufactured housing loans.78 After
the financial crisis of 2008, the Dodd-Frank Act added disclosure and
timing requirements to such loans bearing high interest rates, which
Congress has been considering repealing as onerous and costly—a
House vote was set for mid-April.79 Clayton and other industry leaders
supported repeal while some homeowner and consumer groups were
opposed. On one side, the manufactured housing trade association
stressed the importance of unregulated access for lower income people
to this kind of housing, while consumer advocates urged regulation to
protect the impecunious from costly housing loans.80
Although the original report did not mention these points, the
writers added the theme in a story in mid-May—linking their original
assertions to Clayton’s incentives in the political debate and making it

77 Mike Baker, Buffett Sticks Up For Mobile-home Business at Shareholder
Meeting, SEATTLE TIMES (May 2, 2015), http://www.seattletimes.com/business/realestate/buffett-sticks-up-for-mobile-home-business-at-shareholder-meeting/
[http://perma.cc/7Q3A-4CGY]. All the claims contradict everything Clayton Homes
stands for, as I explained in both my book, Berkshire Beyond Buffett, and in a New York
Times column several months before this piece—a column, incidentally, which Clayton
Homes cited in its response and which the writers dismissed in rebuttal because it was
written by me, whom they called “a longtime Buffett acolyte.” Wagner & Baker, supra
note 76; Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Philosophy of Warren E. Buffett, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK
(May
1,
2015)
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/02/business/dealbook/the-philosophy-of-warren-ebuffett.html [http://perma.cc/CXT4-7S79].
78 Preserving Access to Manufactured Housing Act of 2015, H.R. 650, 114th
Cong. (2015).
79 Id.; H.R. REP. NO. 114-53, at 2–3 (2015).
80 Compare Press Release, Manufactured Home Living News, Dodd-Frank and
Manufactured Home Financing: The Place Where Good Intentions and Unintended
Consequences
Collide
(May
18,
2015),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/05/18/idUSnGNX5smRmG+1c5+GNW2015051
8, [http://perma.cc/SGW3-PWMK] with Zach Carter, House Republicans Hand Warren
Buffett Big Win on Expensive Loans to the Poor, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 14, 2015),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/14/manufactured-housingrepublicans_n_7065810.html [http://perma.cc/VEW5-P8MR].
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clear that they were on the other side of that debate.81 Thus, it appears
that the authors wrote a piece of political advocacy, not investigative
journalism, and targeted Clayton based on ulterior motives, not as
neutral reporters of facts. Notably, it was also revealed that one of the
writers, Wagner, had an undisclosed conflict of interest: his sister was
a lawyer representing plaintiffs in lawsuits against Clayton Homes.82
If Clayton’s formal response and Buffett’s oral comments had
missed their mark, consideration should certainly be given to changing
Berkshire’s lean anti-bureaucratic model to add a department of
political or public affairs at the subsidiary and/or parent levels.83 As
with Greenblatt’s NICO story, the reporters said they repeatedly tried
to connect with Berkshire and Clayton personnel without success84—
undoubtedly in part due to how Berkshire has no public relations
personnel. Also as with the NICO story, it may be more prudent for a
company of Berkshire’s scale and impact to maintain a dedicated
professional to handle such investigative reporting, as distasteful as that
may be to Buffett and others at Berkshire.85

81 Mike Baker, Buffett’s Mobile-Home Business Has Most to Gain From
Deregulation
Plan,
SEATTLE
TIMES
(Mar.
17,
2015),
http://www.seattletimes.com/business/real-estate/buffetts-mobile-home-business-hasmost-to-gain-from-deregulation-plan [http://perma.cc/GQ3Y-R743].
82 Mike Baker, Buffett Sticks Up For Mobile-home Business at Shareholder
Meeting, SEATTLE TIMES (May 2, 2015), http://www.seattletimes.com/business/realestate/buffett-sticks-up-for-mobile-home-business-at-shareholder-meeting
[http://perma.cc/7Q3A-4CGY].
83 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Warren Buffett and Wall Street: The Best of
Frenemies, FIN. HISTORY 16, 18 (Fall 2015).
84 Wagner & Baker, supra note 76.
85 In Clayton’s case, Wagner and Baker continued their campaign, publishing an
incendiary piece the day after Christmas 2015 charging that Clayton’s corporate culture
is rabidly racist. See Mike Baker & Dan Wagner, Minorities Exploited by Warren
Buffett’s
Mobile
Home
Empire, Seattle
Times (Dec.
26,
2015), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/times-watchdog/minoritiesexploited-by-warren-buffetts-mobile-home-empire-clayton-homes [perma.cc/7YZ25MMU]. Clayton promptly responded with a corporate press release repudiating all
allegations. See Press Release, Clayton Homes, Reporting Mischaracterizes Clayton
Homes'
Treatment
of
Customers
and
Employees
(Dec.
26,
2015), http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20151226005004/en/ReportingMischaracterizes-Clayton-Homes%E2%80%99-Treatment-CustomersEmployees [perma.cc/NX8Z-PEPY]. Several Democratic members of the U.S. House
of Representatives Committee on Financial Services called for a federal
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Some Berkshire subsidiaries maintain their own coterie of public
relations and lobbying professionals. Visit the web page of Berkshire
Hathaway Energy, for example, and you will read of its involvement at
the center of important national policy debates ranging from consumer
energy prices to climate change.86 One proxy for the centrality of
Berkshire to national energy policy is the series of shareholder
proposals in recent years seeking to have Berkshire’s board set air
quality goals for its utility businesses—such proposals were made in
2011, 2013 and 2014.87
Berkshire Hathaway Energy has grown to its present continental
scale through acquisition, both before and since Berkshire’s purchase
of it, with each unit maintaining such departments, along with
professionals who regularly engage in price-setting processes with local
public utility authorities.88 The company and its subsidiaries engage in
public debates and policy determinations in matters ranging from the
construction of specific new coal-fired power plants to the national
transition from fossil fuels to solar.
In such settings, the need for professional public relations and
lobbying personnel is clear, as suggested by solar power debates in
Nevada affecting Berkshire’s local public utility, NV Energy. At issue
is how much credit residential solar users get for electricity they
generate for transmission back to the power grid. State law provided for
aggregate credits up to three percent of the utility’s historical peak load
for such “net metering” credit. So long as state-wide solar generation
investigation. See Letter from Rep. Maxine Waters et al. to Richard Cordray, Director,
Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, and Hon. Loretta Lynch, Attorney General (Jan. 12,
2016), http://democrats.financialservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/01.12.2016_manufa
ctured_housing_letter_final.pdf [perma.cc/B5PJ-2JCC].
86 See
BERKSHIRE
HATHAWAY
ENERGY,
https://www.berkshirehathawayenergyco.com [perma.cc/9SCC-ALZ6].
87 Steve Jordon, Warren Watch: Buffett’s ‘German Scout’ On the Hunt, OMAHA
WORLD HERALD (Mar. 22, 2015, 1:00 AM) http://www.omaha.com/money/warrenwatch-buffett-s-german-scout-on-the-hunt/article_92a927bd-1a7f-5436-9cecf02372c24fd6.html [http://perma.cc/GF4D-VAG9].
88 See Berkshire Hathaway Energy, Annual Report on Form 10K (2014) 46, 70–
75 (discussing general corporate as well as unit-buy-unit regulatory matters),
https://www.berkshirehathawayenergyco.com/assets/upload/financialfiling/20141231_99_bhe_annual.pdf [perma.cc/VSL8-VG2S].
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was less than that, all solar users earned full credit; if the limit were
exceeded, new solar users would not get the credit. Solar advocates
sought to boost the cap, arguing it would soon be reached and stressing
the need for economic incentives to sustain solarization; NV Energy
resisted, forecasting reaching the cap much later and noting the need to
avoid having those without solar panels pay more for energy than those
with solar panels.89
Both sides lobbied and engaged public relations campaigns—and
both were accused of overdoing it. At a public hearing on the issue, for
example, lawmakers accused the solar industry of sending “aggressive”
emails criticizing specific people, prompting a leading solar advocate
to apologize publicly for his staff’s work.90 The accusations against NV
Energy went beyond that company to target Berkshire itself, especially
Buffett, turning the local story into a David versus Goliath match
shaded by assertions of overzealous capitalism, greed, and hypocrisy.
One headline read that “Warren Buffett is sending mixed messages on
green energy.”91 Contrasting Buffett’s boasts of Berkshire investments
in renewables with NV’s position in the Nevada debate, one source

89 Net
Metering,
NV
ENERGY,
https://www.nvenergy.com/renewablesenvironment/renewablegenerations/NetMeterin
g.cfm [http:// perma.cc/QBT8-E97Y] (showing that NC Energy offered different rates
to customers depending on time of use). See, e.g., Jim Wrathall, Nevada Solar Update:
Senator Harry Reid Takes On Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway in Net Metering
Debate, SULLIVAN & WORCESTER: ENERGY FIN. REPORT (Sept. 8, 2015, 8:00 AM),
http://blog.sandw.com/energyfinancereport/2015/09/nevada-solar-update-senatorharry-reid-takes-on-warren-buffets-berkshire-hathaway-in-net-metering-debate
[http://perma.cc/EF5J-8BK8]; Herman K. Trabish, As Regulators Act, Nevada Net
Metering Debate Takes Center Stage at Las Vegas Conference, UTILITY DIVE (Aug. 31,
2015),
http://www.utilitydive.com/news/as-regulators-act-nevada-net-meteringdebate-takes-center-stage-at-las-veg/404799 [http://perma.cc/V4ZF-3WUP]; Krysti
Shallenberg, Heated Debate in Nev. Over Solar Net Metering Settles Down,
GOVERNORS’
WIND
ENERGY
COAL.
(May
26,
2015),
http://www.governorswindenergycoalition.org/?p=13146
[https://perma.cc/M2LLEW8D].
90 Reem Nasr, Ground Zero in the Solar Wars: Nevada, CNBC (May 26, 2015,
1:44
PM),
http://www.cnbc.com/2015/05/26/ground-zero-in-the-solar-warsnevada.html [http://perma.cc/HCT5-C2VC].
91 Mark Chediak, Noah Buhayar, & Margaret Newkirk, Warren Buffett Is Sending
Mixed Messages on Green Energy, BLOOMBERG BUSINESS (May 18, 2015, 12:09 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-18/berkshire-fights-rooftop-solaras-buffett-champions-green-energy [http://perma.cc/G786-ZCTK].
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cynically declared “it always comes down to money . . . even if it looks
kind of hypocritical.”92
While editors may have liked the story line pitting consumer-loving,
tree-hugging do-gooders against the monopolistic profiteers at
Berkshire, in fact the duller reality was the complex and contestable
public policy of transitioning from fossil fuels to renewables.93
Berkshire has a dog in that fight and NV Energy is one of the many
Berkshire Hathaway Energy subsidiaries actively engaged in the
process. It would be absurd to believe, however, that energy scientists
and business executives alone will define the dialogue and process
everything that the energy company requires be said. For that, the
company must have public relations specialists and lobbying
professionals on staff.
More generally, while Berkshire has won plaudits for good
corporate citizenship,94 some complain about the absence of
conglomerate-wide reporting on social responsibility or sustainability.95
Berkshire’s unusual structure does not lend itself to issuing a formal
corporate report at the Berkshire level and most of the subsidiaries are
essentially semi-private: given the parent’s gargantuan size, all but a
few subsidiaries are so small in relation to it that only limited disclosure

92

Id.
Reem Nasr of CNBC quoted me correctly as follows:
The question is how fast we should move as a society in transition from fossil fuels to
renewables, because there will be a transition eventually. Berkshire [executives] are
capitalists who are interested in returns. But at the same time, [Buffett] has scruples and
the company has a conscience.
Nasr, supra note 90.
94 E.g., BOS. COLL. CARROLL SCH. OF MGMT., THE MOST RESPECTED U.S.
COMPANIES
(2008),
http://www.bcccc.net/_uploads/documents/live/GlobalPulse2008.pdf?__hstc=166758
561.28c25f3522ded499ee82095cf3ff99bd.1447538430494.1447971346846.14480598
56934.3&__hssc=166758561.1.1448059856934&__hsfp=607606643
[http://perma.cc/9KQR-E9AC] (ranking Berkshire ninth out of 203 companies
analyzed based on survey data of 20,000 people).
95 Elaine Cohen, Warren Buffett on Sustainability. Not., CSR-REPORTING (June
12, 2010), http://csr-reporting.blogspot.com/2010/06/warren-buffett-on-sustainabilitynot.html [http://perma.cc/6A8X-YKNZ].
93
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is included about them in Berkshire’s public filings.96 While all can
indeed fend for themselves and there is some cost to having a
centralized public relations function, creating an effective office need
not be a splurge.
It would be simple enough to hire a single professional to oversee
all the subsidiaries and to guard Berkshire’s reputation from Omaha as
needed. The cost would be modest and there would be scant imposition
on subsidiary autonomy. On a related note, Berkshire likewise has no
general counsel’s office, and while that has generally not been a
problem, it has occasionally failed to make legally required filings.97
While apparently not material, such lapses show poor corporate
housekeeping. Such practices are not ones that any company should
want and impose costs on the business. Correcting it would be relatively
simple: hire a general counsel.

E. Hypocrisy Charges and Uncertainty Due to Alter Ego
Buffett kept a relatively low profile through most of his career. He
became a celebrity only in the early 2000s. Although as Berkshire’s
public face he previously took positions on corporate topics—
accounting, governance, and takeovers—at that point he began to
address general matters of national interest, including the hot button
issues of taxes and wealth. But those topics tended to entwine Buffett’s
private life with Berkshire’s future—especially its ownership

96

See
BERKSHIRE
HATHAWAY
ANN.
REP.
at
125
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2014ar/2014ar.pdf
[perma.cc/N8EA-R6Z6]
(showing total number of Berkshire employees as 340,499). Two large Berkshire
subsidiaries, Berkshire Hathaway Energy and BNSF, have public debt outstanding and
therefore file regular periodic reports with the Securities and Exchange Commission
containing considerable detail. Berkshire Hathaway Energy, Annual Report on Form
10K (2014) https://www.berkshirehathawayenergyco.com/assets/upload/financialfiling/20141231_99_bhe_annual.pdf [http://perma.cc/MR2P-M84V]; 2014 BNSF
RAILWAY
FORM
10-K
FILING,
http://www.bnsf.com/about-bnsf/financialinformation/form-10-k-filings/pdf/10k-llc-2014.pdf [http:// perma.cc/UHE3-KADU].
97 David McLaughlin, Warren Buffett Agrees to Settlement After Violating
Antitrust
Laws,
SYDNEY
MORNING
HERALD
(Aug.
21,
2014),
http://www.smh.com.au/business/warren-buffett-agrees-to-settlement-after-violatingantitrust-laws [http://perma.cc/S8LN-Y5MT]. Berkshire generally retains Munger,
Tolles & Olson LLP for legal work, which tends to involve corporate acquisitions and
securities disclosure.
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structure—so they were uniquely suited for him to address. It presented
a downside, however.
People conflated Buffett’s views on estate taxes, which he
supported, with Berkshire’s interest in acquiring family companies at
discounts when owners faced such tax liabilities. That is especially
costly considering how Berkshire itself is a microcosm of America—
some of its subsidiaries were founded and run by deeply conservative
families in Salt Lake City and Waco, others by progressives in Boston
and Seattle. The company’s businesses are managed by devout
Christians, observant Jews, and practicing Mormons, as well as
agnostics and atheists, Americans, Germans and Israelis, totaling nearly
350,000 employees worldwide.98
Buffett’s condemnation of the financial services industry has
provoked both ire and charges of hypocrisy. One-third of Berkshire’s
$130 billion investment portfolio is concentrated in financial
intermediaries, including longstanding substantial positions in
American Express and Wells Fargo, plus stakes in controversial
institutions at the center of the 2008 financial crisis like Bank of
America and Moody’s.99 Yet Buffett lambasts banks and other financial
intermediaries for both high fees and poor services.100
Similarly, as noted earlier, Buffett is a critic of private equity
companies, yet partnered twice in recent years with private equity firm
3G in substantial acquisitions.101 The perceived wedge between word
and deed and related criticism is longstanding. In the 1980s, Buffett
chastised leveraged buyout operators, corporate raiders, and the bankers

98 Lawrence A. Cunningham, Big-hearted Warren Buffett’s Guide to Giving,
CNBC (Dec. 5, 2014 8:00 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2014/12/05/where-big-heartedbuffett-and-his-best-friend-disagree.html [http:// perma.cc/777G-ZBPF].
99 See
2014
BERKSHIRE
HATHAWAY
ANN.
REP.
17,
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/2014ar/2014ar.pdf
[http://perma.cc/W4L52CMM] (among total portfolio value of $117 billion, listing American Express,
Goldman Sachs, Moody’s, US Bancorp, and Wells Fargo, aggregating to $50 billion).
100 THE ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETT, supra note 14, 169–174; see Anupretta Das,
Warren Buffett Has an Image Problem, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 12, 2015, 6:43 PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/warren-buffett-has-an-image-problem-1447371811
[perma.cc/MXH2-EQNQ].
101 See supra notes 50–55 and accompanying text.

July 2016]

BERKSHIRE’S BLEMISHES

133

who charged vast fees to aid them; yet Berkshire owned a large stake in
Salomon, which earned substantial profits by arranging debt financing
and facilitating hostile takeovers.102 It is possible to square these
positions—chosen companies are exceptions, distinguishing relative
fees from blanket reproach, or contrast Buffett’s personal views from
Berkshire’s corporate practices. But the disconnect remains a cost, one
derived from the executive choice of public statements.
Buffett’s and Berkshire’s approaches to taxes present a similar
disconnect that has posed related costs. For example, Buffett has said
and written about the unfairness of the American tax code, famously
saying his secretary pays more taxes than he does.103 Yet Berkshire
defers taxes through lengthy holding periods, finds innumerable ways
to minimize taxes and maximize tax credits, and pursues taxadvantaged transactions. Howls of hypocrisy result which, of course,
confuse Buffett the individual with Berkshire the company104 as well as
miss the difference between pure tax strategies and the broader
investment values Berkshire has long adopted.105
Among tax-advantaged deals that could equally be explained by
Berkshire’s fundamental investment philosophy was its 2014 swap of
long-time holdings in the Washington Post Co. (then called Graham
Holdings) for a television station; an outright sale of the stock would
have triggered capital gains of some $400 million.106 Or consider
Berkshire’s swap in 2015 of long-time holdings in Gillette (dating to
102 See Dale A. Oesterle, Revisiting the Anti-Takeover Fervor of the ‘80s Through
the Letters of Warren Buffett, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 565, 573–77 (1997).
103 See Warren E. Buffett, Stop Coddling the Super-Rich, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/15/opinion/stop-coddling-the-superrich.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/2JVS-XSFQ]; Morris Propp, Warren Buffett’s Nifty
Tax Loophole, BARRON’S (Apr. 11, 2015), http://www.barrons.com/articles/warrenbuffetts-nifty-tax-loophole-1428726092# [http://perma.cc/9ZLH-YRA8].
104 Propp, supra note 103; Tim Worstall, Warren Buffet’s Very Strange Tax
Argument,
FORBES
(Aug.
15,
2011),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2011/08/15/warren-buffetts-very-strange-taxargument [http://perma.cc/Z2W4-B9R2].
105 See THE ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETT, supra note 14, at 282–85.
106 See Antoine Gara, Berkshire May Avoid $400 Million Tax Bill in Graham
Holdings
Swap,
THE
STREET
(Mar.
14,
2014),
http://www.thestreet.com/story/12529683/1/berkshire-may-avoid-400-million-taxbill-in-graham-holdings-swap.html [http://perma.cc/XZQ8-RVLE].
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the 1980s and eventually part of Procter & Gamble) in exchange for the
Duracell battery business, which included nearly $2 billion in cash, yet
was tax-deferred. Selling that stock for cash, given Berkshire’s basis of
$336 million and a market value of $4.7 billion, would have triggered a
tax of $1.66 billion.107 Despite tax advantages, all such transactions
reflect Berkshire’s longstanding fundamental values, which drive the
decisions.108
Small companies might be the alter egos of their owners, as the
Supreme Court held in the Hobby Lobby case, saying they have
constitutional rights to the free exercise of religion.109 But large
companies like Berkshire are not the dummies of their leaders and
corporate decisions are not political statements. In running Berkshire,
Buffett has a fiduciary duty. It requires him to make decisions based on
what is best for Berkshire, not on whether they are consistent with his
views on tax fairness or other political convictions. Given its size, it is
no surprise that Berkshire shareholders are diverse politically and,
while most concur with Berkshire policies and Buffett’s business
philosophy, they do not invariably agree with Buffett’s political
views.110
The alter ego phenomenon has produced both Berkshire’s greatest
value and ultimate cost: Buffett made the company great and his

See Allan Sloan, It’s Not Hard to Close the Cash-Rich Split-off Loophole,
WASHINGTON
POST
(Jan.
21,
2015)
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/its-not-hard-to-close-the-cashrich-split-off-loophole/2015/01/21/87da04ae-9dcb-11e4-bcfb059ec7a93ddc_story.html [https://perma.cc/RP62-7LNM]; Steve Jordan, Stock-forcompany Duracell Deal Follows Berkshire Pattern, OMAHA WORLD HERALD (Nov. 11,
2014, 1:00 AM), http://www.omaha.com/money/stock-for-company-duracell-dealfollows-berkshire-pattern/article_ea6cc45d-a97c-561e-9e36-fefd57991e9d.html
[http://perma.cc/H983-8TJ8].
108 See Adam Shell, Buffett Snaps Up Duracell from P&G, USA TODAY (Nov. 13,
2014, 7:50 AM), http://americasmarkets.usatoday.com/2014/11/13/buffett-snaps-upduracell-from-pg [http://perma.cc/L6WX-FWEY] (quoting the author to the foregoing
effect and adding the example of Berkshire’s swap of a minority stake in Phillips 66 for
all assets of a pipeline lubricant business).
109 See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014).
110 See Luciana Lopez, Where Shareholders Disagree with Buffett: Politics,
REUTERS (May 4, 2015), http://blogs.reuters.com/talesfromthetrail/2015/05/04/whereshareholders-disagree-with-buffett-politics [http://perma.cc/2HGL-5EB3].
107

July 2016]

BERKSHIRE’S BLEMISHES

135

eventual departure raises questions about succession in a way that other
executive succession plans do not. Berkshire cannot be replicated, and
the man cannot be replaced. Critics say the company cannot survive
without him. For example, The Economist wrote, as Buffett became an
octogenarian, that Berkshire was down to “playing out the last hand,”
contending that in holding the contrary view, I am “too easily
convinced.”111 Steven Davidoff Salomon in the New York Times
lamented that Buffett graced Berkshire with an irreplaceable magic
touch.112 At Berkshire’s 2013 annual meeting, the investor Douglas
Kass asserted his belief that Berkshire is no more likely to survive
without Buffett than Teledyne was without Henry Singleton.113
If the critics are right, that is a huge cost. Even if they prove
incorrect, the fact that such a perception is widely held is a modest cost.

F.

Miscellaneous: Public Family Firms and The Tenure Myth

Certain problems and costs are not easy to classify and there may be
costs other than those identified above that warrant attention. For one,
as taught by the Dexter and Gen Re deals, using cash avoids amplifying
the cost of mistaken acquisitions. While undoubtedly beneficial, this
feature of the Berkshire model also presents a cost that manifests
whenever paying stock would produce advantages in a transaction. That
happens when the selling shareholders value stock more than cash. For
example, where selling shareholders’ tax basis is low, receiving shares
defers significant taxes that would be due if sold for cash.

111 See Berkshire Hathaway: Playing Out the Last Hand, THE ECONOMIST (Apr.
26, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21601240-warren-buffetts-50years-running-berkshire-hathaway-have-been-one-businesss-most-impressive
[http://perma.cc/94VX-BW67]; Berkshire Hathaway: The Post-Buffett World, THE
ECONOMIST (Jan. 10, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/business-booksquarterly/21638099-succession-biggest-challenge-post-buffett-world
[http://perma.cc/L3Z3-YMP8].
112 Steven Davidoff Salomon, With His Magic Touch, Buffett May Be
Irreplaceable for Berkshire, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (May 21, 2013, 6:50 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/21/buffett-with-his-magic-touch-may-beirreplaceable/ [http://perma.cc/74T7-LLGQ].
113 See Andrew Ross Sorkin, For Buffett, the Past Isn’t Always Prologue, N.Y.
TIMES:
DEALBOOK
(May
6,
2013,
9:23
PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/06/for-buffett-the-past-isnt-always-prologue/
[http://perma.cc/93E3-32RD].
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The cost to Berkshire of preferring paying in cash rather than stock
is most acute in the context of targets that are publicly-traded family
businesses. Family businesses appeal to Berkshire as they often bring a
sense of legacy and permanence that is central to the Berkshire business
model. Many families prize Berkshire’s commitments to autonomy and
permanence, often selling to Berkshire for less than rival bids or
intrinsic value. For family businesses owned solely by close-knit groups
who all wish to sell to Berkshire, the cash preference at a discount
creates no problems.
But problems arise for publicly-traded family businesses. When
directors of such companies sell control, they are duty-bound to get the
best value for shareholders.114 In a stock deal where all holders share
gains in future business value, those directors could consider
Berkshire’s special culture in valuing the transaction.115 But with cash,
all such future value goes to Berkshire’s shareholders, not the target’s
public stockholder, who would also gain nothing from the autonomy or
permanence that family members prize in a sale to Berkshire. So target
directors will resist an all cash sale at a discount and seek rival suitors
at higher prices, even stimulating an auction to drive price up—
repelling Berkshire, which avoids auctions.116
An example can be drawn from Berkshire’s 2003 acquisition of
Clayton Homes, a publicly traded family business bought for a modest
(seven percent) premium to market. Many Clayton shareholders
objected; one, Cerberus Capital Management, told Clayton it wanted
the chance to make a competing bid; another sued.117 The result was a
six-month delay in getting to a shareholder vote, which narrowly
approved the Berkshire deal.118

114
115

See Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del.

1989).
116 Warren E. Buffet, Letter to Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. (Feb.
27,
2015),
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2014ltr.pdf
[http://perma.cc/M94G-YE9F] (“We don’t participate in auctions.”).
117 See Denver Area Meat Cutters v. Clayton, 209 S.W.3d 584 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2006); Denver Area Meat Cutters v. Clayton, 120 S.W.3d 841 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003).
118 Andrew Ross Sorkin, Buffett Wins Battle to Buy Clayton Homes, N.Y. TIMES
(July 31, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/31/business/buffett-wins-battle-tobuy-clayton-homes.html [http://perma.cc/XN3R-X2F9].
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Many Clayton shareholders were disappointed, but Cerberus opted
not to outbid Berkshire, and the court dismissed the lawsuit.119 The
scenario remains unattractive to Berkshire, however, given the risk of
litigation, delay and rival bids. Under Berkshire’s acute aversion to
bidding in any auction, the risk of an auction would be enough to deter
Berkshire from bidding at all. The upshot: the publicly traded family
business is outside Berkshire’s acquisition model, amounting to an
opportunity cost for what would otherwise be a sweet spot.
Another miscellaneous cost category concerns the myth of the
permanent manager at Berkshire.120 Berkshire prides itself on the long
tenure of its senior managers. But besides highly-publicized departures
such as those described earlier, there are numerous quieter ones. In each
of a dozen cases, the frustrating fact is opacity about causes or
resolutions. Berkshire offers little or nothing by way of commentary
and the executives are mum, perhaps owing to contractual
commitments in severance agreements or, more likely, in light of
Berkshire culture, out of a sense of loyalty.
Some low-key executive departures include the following. In the
1990s, Fechheimer Brothers, a uniform maker, had a series of
presidents, including Richard Bentley, promoted from Scott Fetzer. In
1998, Bentley resigned from Fechheimer without comment by him or
Berkshire. He was succeeded by Patrick Byrne, who stayed just two
years.121 In 2002, Sheila O’Connell Cooper, chief executive of The
Pampered Chef, left after five months on the job without a trace.122 In
2006, Barry Tatelman withdrew from management of Jordan’s

119

See CUNNINGHAM, BERKSHIRE BEYOND BUFFETT, supra note 6, at 61–62.
See ROBERT P. MILES, THE WARREN BUFFETT CEO: SECRETS FROM THE
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY MANAGERS 357–58 (2003).
121 Geert De Lombaerde, Fechheimer President Exits, CINCINNATI BUSINESS
COURIER
(May
16,
1998),
http://www.bizjournals.com/cincinnati/stories/1998/03/16/story5.html
[http://perma.cc/AH87-7QWK]; ANDREW KILPATRICK, OF PERMANENT VALUE 438
(2011).
122 See KAREN LINDER, THE WOMEN OF BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY: LESSONS FROM
WARREN BUFFETT’S FEMALE CEOS AND DIRECTORS 93 (2012).
120
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Furniture, to embark on a career in the arts, leaving his brother Eliot in
charge.123
In 2007, soon after Sokol joined the board of Johns Manville, its
CEO Steven B. Hochhauser was replaced by a MidAmerican Energy
colleague, Todd M. Raba, who stayed only until 2012.124 Finally, in
2012, Larson-Juhl’s long-time chief Steve McKenzie was replaced by
Drew Van Pelt, newly-minted Harvard MBA, who had no experience
in the industry. Apparently, Van Pelt was a choice of Tracy Britt Cool
(who subsequently became chief executive of The Pampered Chef).125

G. Coda: Partnership Manqué
Berkshire annual meetings once drew a few hundred people who,
along with Buffett, owned a decisive majority of the stock. They felt the
genuine bonds of a true partnership. Today, the meeting draws more
than 40,000 out of nearly one million shareholders. Buffett’s interest is
now down to a third, and the inner core group’s holdings are unlikely
to exceed a majority. Buffett continues to talk about Berkshire having a
corporate form with a partnership attitude. But it is only an attitude and
it no longer genuinely reflects a true partnership.
The shareholders have signaled surprisingly close to unanimity on
dividend policy.126 But discussions with shareholders indicate a greater
division of opinion.127 You can expect once Buffett leaves the scene that
some shareholders will become active in seeking policy changes,

Keith Reed, Bowing Out at Jordan’s, BOSTON GLOBE (Dec. 22, 2006),
http://www.boston.com/business/articles/2006/12/22/bowing_out_at_jordans/
[http://perma.cc/A7VH-Z2FJ].
124 Vanessa Small, New at the Top, WASHINGTON POST (Oct. 27, 2013),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/new-at-the-top-to-meet-warrenbuffett-this-outdoorsman-didnt-stay-lost-in-the-woods/2013/10/27/924ffe10-3d8311e3-b6a9-da62c264f40e_story.html [https://perma.cc/5VXH-7SLM].
125 See CUNNINGHAM, BERKSHIRE BEYOND BUFFETT, supra note 6, at 193–194.
126 CONVERSATIONS FROM THE BUFFETT ESSAYS SYMPOSIUM 24–25 (Lawrence A.
Cunningham ed., forthcoming 2016) (Buffett exchange with Cunningham indicating
results of an early 1990s precatory Berkshire shareholder resolution overwhelmingly
supporting Berkshire’s dividend policy); ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETT, supra note 14,
at 198 (reporting results of a 2013 precatory shareholder resolution on Berkshire
dividend policy with 98% of the shares voting favoring the no dividend policy).
127 See CUNNINGHAM, BERKSHIRE BEYOND BUFFETT, supra note 6, at 208.
123
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including some touching on the Berkshire model. While the dividend
policy remains a plus without a cost, the disagreements over it might be
classified as a cost. It arises from the broader costs of a shareholder
body that has grown through major stock-based acquisitions, including
Gen Re and especially BNSF, as well as Dexter, Dairy Queen and
others. Ultimately, as with all other costs of the Berkshire model, it
emanates from principle number one, which is conceiving of the
corporation as a partnership.

III. IMPLICATIONS FOR PEERS AND POLICY
Beyond the important upshot of this analysis for Berkshire
Hathaway are lessons for policymakers and others. The Berkshire
model successfully emerged despite bucking five powerful trends
affecting the rest of corporate America that cut in the opposite direction.
These are: the rise of the independent director and monitoring board;
the decline of executive power; the elevation of internal controls to a
first-order policy option; the eclipse of the conglomerate form; and the
proliferation of shareholder activism and hostile takeovers. The
Berkshire model’s success strengthens the case against these features
and their rigidity. (As with the previous Part, this one opens with a chart
depicting highlights, here comparing five major issues that distinguish
Berkshire from prevailing practice in corporate America, along with the
important implications of the contrast.)

140

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2016

TABLE 2: VALUE OF BERKSHIRE’S PRACTICES V.
CORPORATE AMERICA
ISSUE

BERKSHIRE’S
PRACTICE

CORPORATE
AMERICA

LESSON

A.1 Governance:
Board Role

Advisory: board is
supportive
advisory
body
there to help the
CEO

Champion
flexibility
in
governance
design to allow
for
different
board types and
roles

A.2 Governance:
CEO Power

Consolidated: CEO
wields near-total
corporate power

Monitoring:
numerous forces in
recent decades have
transformed boards
into interventionist
overseers
and
supervisors
of
executives
Neutralized:
numerous forces in
recent decades have
operated to reduce
or check CEO
power

A.3 Culture

Trust:
relies
heavily on a culture
of mutual trust and
loyalty to promote
desirable behavior

Stress that trust
and loyalty are
often far more
valuable
motivators than
controls

B. Conglomerate
Form

Epitome:
demonstrates
enormous success
that
can
be
obtained
from
well-defined
conglomerate
structure
Shunned: has never
made
hostile
takeovers
or
exhibited activist
tendencies
and
would do well to
assure itself strong
defenses against
such assaults

Control: numerous
forces in recent
decades have led to
corporations
adopting abundant
internal controls to
shape behavior
Eclipsed:
fallen
from favor but
pockets of success
remain

C.
Hostile/Activist
Takeovers

Pervasive
Welcomed Threat:
seen as important
tool of corporate
governance
and
widely applied with
mixed results

Appreciate that
sometimes
strong CEOs
are far more
desirable than
weak CEOs

Keep an open
mind about the
possible
optimality of
the
conglomerate
form for some
firms
Remain
solicitous
of
takeover
defenses and
cautious
of
exuberant
activism
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A. Governance and Culture
The most general implication of Berkshire’s model for public policy
is to preserve the possibility for variation in governance design and
business structure. This implication spans many topics, including the
character and duties of the board of directors, the strength of corporate
chief executives, and the degree of organizational direction harnessed
by trust versus control. American policies on all such topics have taken
directions during the past thirty years that are the opposite of the
direction Berkshire has taken.

1. Board Role
During the latter half of Berkshire’s rise to prominence, boards of
American companies shifted from the advisory model to the monitoring
model as people from multiple vantage points heralded the outside
director as the solution to governance challenges.128 The rise of
independent directors displaced the importance of expertise and
obscured the traits Berkshire boasts in its directors, especially ownerorientation, understanding of business, and commitment to Berkshire’s
prosperity. These policy paths were driven largely by periodic needs to
quell political disputes or respond to crises. The appeal to independence
helped generate consensus while devaluing expertise.129
Director independence remains a valued characteristic in corporate
governance, but expertise is making a comeback. Thus the SarbanesOxley Act all but requires financial expertise on the board,130 and
the Dodd-Frank Act contemplates a similar approach to compensation
committees.131 As my colleague and now SEC Commissioner Lisa
Fairfax has explained, there is a case for the inside director, even if an
128 Lawrence A. Cunningham, Rediscovering Board Expertise: Legal
Implications of the Empirical Literature, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 465, 469–470 (2008).
129 See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the NYSE’s Director
Independence Listing Standards, 30 SEC. REG. L.J. 370, 381 (2002).
130 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745
(2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7201–7266 (2012)); Securities Exchange Commission,
Item 407(d)(5) of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(d)(5) (2014); Rule 10A-3, 17
C.F.R. § 240.10a-3 (2014).
131 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L.
No. 111-203 § 952, 124 Stat. 1376, 1900-03 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-3);
Rule 10c-l, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10c-1 (2014).

142

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2016

uneasy one.132 The Berkshire model proves both the value of expertise
and the value of having some deliberative body available to handle
crises (e.g., the Sokol-Lubrizol affair133) and to steer the business during
transitions (Buffett is relying heavily on the Berkshire board to assure
continuity after he leaves the scene).134 The Berkshire model suggests
that there are both reasons to have a board and reasons to oppose its
primacy.135 Berkshire shows that a corporation can thrive with an
advisory board of the old fashioned model.

2. CEO Power
Before the 1990s, CEOs wielded substantial power, selecting the
directors and enjoying the latitude that comes with deferential or
passive shareholders. The rise of the independent board and of
shareholder activism changed this dynamic, as boards and owners
gained influence and exercised it to curtail executive power. The longterm effects of such a shift are yet to crystalize, but are likely to be
sweeping.136 The Berkshire model is a reminder of the value of
executive power and a cautionary note about such broad scale change.
Indeed, in his role as chief executive, Buffett has avoided the trap of
other icons, who may be prone to vanity or licentiousness, proving that
such flaws are not inevitable.137 Berkshire’s plan to divide Buffett’s
historical roles as chairman and chief executive between two
individuals shows the appeal of governance design flexibility for
132 Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for the Inside Director, 96 IOWA L. REV.
127 (2010).
133 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
134 See THE ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETT, supra note 14, at 296 (discussing
Berkshire’s future and stressing: “We have an extraordinarily knowledgeable and
business-oriented board of directors ready to carry out [our] promise of partnership.”).
135 Compare Kelli A. Alces, Beyond the Board of Directors, 46 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 783 (2011) (arguing for the abolition of the corporate board as anachronistic) with
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547 (2003) (arguing that the corporate board should
wield considerable power at the apex of the corporate hierarchy).
136 See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 987
(2010) (cataloging dozens of profound implications ranging from regulatory backlash
to international corporate convergence).
137 See Tom C.W. Lin, The Corporate Governance of Iconic Executives, 87
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 351, 366–67, 375 (2011) (suggesting that iconic CEOs win too
much organizational and legal deference (citing Steve Jobs), are prone to
overconfidence (citing Buffett) and even licentiousness (citing Michael Eisner)).
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different contexts—uniting the roles is best during Buffett’s tenure but
dividing them seems better post-Buffett.138

3. Control Versus Trust
Over the past four decades, corporate internal controls became a
first-order policy option to respond to a wide variety of national
problems, from financial fraud to terrorist financing.139 Despite their
proliferation as regulatory tools to address issues ranging from
consumer price gouging to worker safety and environmental protection,
it is difficult to evaluate whether controls work and are worth their
considerable cost.140
Corporate controls began as internal processes with positive
aspirations of helping a corporation meet its objectives, a conception
creating modest expectations of results. By using them as a leading
policy option, controls assume a negative character. They become
processes designed to prevent certain undesired events from occurring,
a conception doomed to disappointed expectations. Controls are
inherently limited in what they can do, making the modest expectations
associated with positive aspirational controls sensible but increasing the
likelihood of disappointed expectations associated with the more
ambitious efforts of negative preventive controls.
Systemic forces make controls an attractive policy option. The rise
of the board monitoring model played an important role, as controls
dovetailed with such oversight.141 Movements for deregulation and
cooperative compliance made controls appealing as alternatives to
direct regulation. Resistance to federal preemption of state law makes
controls an attractive way to inject federal policy into corporate affairs.
The corporate social responsibility movement demands greater
accountability; controls addressing interests of particular constituencies
seem tailor-made for the purpose. An entire compliance industry arose,

138

See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls to
Fight Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 J. CORP. L. 267, 268 (2004).
140 See generally MICHAEL POWER, THE AUDIT SOCIETY: RITUALS OF
VERIFICATION (1999) (describing the complexity and high cost of auditing regimes).
141 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Board of Directors and Internal Control, 19
CARDOZO L. REV. 237, 238–39 (1997).
139
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led by auditors and lawyers who developed expertise in the design,
implementation and testing of controls.
Yet these forces often resulted in controls that appear to work and
can be audited rather than controls that work in fact.142 The result:
corporate America tends to expect far more from internal controls than
such systems can deliver. The Berkshire experience, using minimalist
controls in favor of heavy reliance on trust, demonstrates that controls
are not necessary to promote compliance or other desirable outcomes.
Policymakers should be willing to tolerate more trust-based corporate
cultures than the prevailing climate favoring control permits. But even
Berkshire maintains a system of internal control over financial reporting
because, as Buffett joked, “no sense being a damned fool.”143
Still, the overwhelming principles of corporate governance and
culture at Berkshire Hathaway are responsibility and trust. Such a
model stands in sharp contrast to prevailing views among theorists and
norms among practitioners.144 The theorists assume pervasive agency
costs—managers acting with self-interest in derogation of owner
interests—and many managers do in fact exhibit such behavior.145 Yet
not all do and Berkshire exhibits a whole cadre of managers operating
in the opposite manner. David F. Larcker and Brian Tayan of Stanford
University summed up the implications with a poignancy and a
question: “The operating principles of Berkshire Hathaway are in stark
contrast to the “best practices” recommended by governance experts.
What does this say about the reliability of those best practices?”146

142 See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of
Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 487 (2003).
143 Warren E. Buffet, Letter to Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc. (Feb.
17,
2015),
http://www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2014ltr.pdf
[http://perma.cc/M94G-YE9F].
144 See Eisenberg, supra note 141, at 250.
145 See James P. Holdcroft, Jr. & Jonathan R. Macey, Flexibility in Determining
the Role of the Board of Directors in the Age of Information, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 291,
296 (1997).
146 David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, Berkshire Hathaway: The Role of Trust in
Governance,
STAN.
CLOSER
LOOK
SERIES
(May
28,
2010),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1678033 [http://perma.cc/7VWGU2WS].
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B. The Conglomerate Form
Despite Berkshire’s blemishes, the company avoided the major
pitfalls of its form of business organization—the conglomerate, which
was fashionable when Buffett began running Berkshire in 1965 but
gradually and steadily faded from fashion while Berkshire prospered
and perfected the model.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the conglomerate form of business
organization flourished in corporate America, in part due to enactment
in 1950 of the Celler-Kefauver Act which discouraged mergers among
rivals, stimulating acquisitions of unrelated businesses.147 Massive
companies were built through numerous diverse acquisitions by
powerful chief executives. One prominent example is ITT which, under
the leadership of Harold Geneen and later Rand Araskog, boasted 350
different companies, including baking, car rentals, hotels, and
insurance.148 Another example is Teledyne, assembled by Harry
Singleton as nearly 100 different businesses encompassing acoustic
speakers, aeronautics, banking, computers, engines, and insurance.149
By 1980, the majority of Fortune 500 companies were
conglomerates.150 Rationales included exploiting scale, seizing
synergies, spreading managerial acumen, and diversifying investments.
But critics perceived an indulgent empire building by imperious
executives as many of these businesses struggled, incurred significant
losses for sustained periods, misallocated capital internally, or

147 See Sanjai Bhagat, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Hostile Takeovers in
the 1980s: The Return to Corporate Specialization, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC
ACTIVITY:
MICROECONOMICS
55–56
(1990),
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/shleifer/files/hostile_takeovers_80s.pdf?m=136004238
3 [http://perma.cc/T63S-BA6S].
148 See generally ROBERT SOBEL, ITT: THE MANAGEMENT OF OPPORTUNITY
(2000) (documenting the multiple companies that ITT invested in at various points).
149 See generally GEORGE A. ROBERTS WITH ROBERT J. MCVICKER, DISTANT
FORCE: A MEMOIR OF THE TELEDYNE CORPORATION AND THE MAN WHO CREATED IT
(2007) (documenting the multiple companies that Teledyne invested in).
150 Gerald F. Davis et al., The Decline and Fall of the Conglomerate Firm in the
1980s: The Deinstitutionalization of an Organizational Form, 59 AM. SOC. REV. 547,
553 (1995).
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otherwise proved difficult to manage.151 Under pressure from hostile
corporate takeover artists seeking to maximize shareholder value as
well as academics urging greater focus, the conglomerate model began
to unravel. Raiders such as Carl Icahn and Ronald Perlman and buyout
firms such as Kohlberg Kravis Roberts targeted or acquired
conglomerates and proceeded to break them up while others, like ITT
and Teledyne, simply succumbed to the changing times and divided into
multiple discrete corporations.152
By 1990, the era of the conglomerates was over, and widely viewed
as a systemic mistake. Top executives prone to conglomerate-wide
systems and micromanagement ultimately undermined operational
success. Subsidiary managers could execute more effectively when
permitted to apply systems tailored to the needs of their business and
focused on areas within their unique expertise. Boards of directors,
increasingly called upon as active monitors of managers rather than
loyal advisors, could not oversee sprawling empires. Shareholders
could diversify for themselves more efficiently than conglomerate
executives who proved inept at allocating capital. And U.S. antitrust
policy had swung back in the direction of solicitude toward mergers
among rivals.153
During this same period, however, Berkshire transformed itself
from a small investment partnership in the 1960s, into a diversified
conglomerate with vast stock holdings by 1995. Today, it is a
conglomerate more sprawling than ITT, Teledyne, or any of the other
colossuses of the 1980s, such as Beatrice, Gulf & Western, Litton, or
Textron. And its performance is peerless. One broad reason for this
success is that Berkshire recognized and avoided all the pitfalls: Buffett,
as chief executive, is the opposite of a micromanager; Berkshire’s

151 ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETT, supra note 14, at 287 (discussing Buffett’s
account of the poor reputation of the conglomerate business model and how the
Berkshire model differs).
152 See GEORGE P. BAKER & GEORGE DAVID SMITH, THE NEW FINANCIAL
CAPITALISTS: KOHLBERG KRAVIS ROBERTS AND THE CREATION OF CORPORATE VALUE
168 (1998) (“[t]he documented behavior of successful conglomerates shows that they
tended to be opportunistic buyers but reluctant sellers of companies. So long as
constituent business units continued to meet minimal corporate performance criteria,
they were unlikely to be sold.”).
153 See Davis, supra note 150, at 554.
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decentralization and principle of managerial autonomy enables
managerial focus; Buffett’s investment acumen made Berkshire’s
practice of diversification valuable to investors; and Berkshire’s
internal capital allocation saved stockholders sizable transaction costs
and taxes.
Berkshire was not the only conglomerate to prosper amid the anticonglomerate environment of recent decades. Several other thriving
conglomerates stand out among widely-held public companies. A
venerable case is General Electric, whose divisions span aviation,
energy management, jet engines, light bulbs, and water. Despite a
recent downsizing to focus more on industrial businesses—divesting its
appliances, capital and real estate businesses—the moves were not anticonglomerate, but were instead a divestiture of businesses not meeting
minimum profit thresholds,154 and the banking business had become
newly regulated by Dodd Frank.155 In fact, the company remained
committed to potential acquisitions that would sustain the conglomerate
model.156 Another example is United Technologies, a lower-profile
company operating a diverse group of iconic brands such as Carrier air
conditioning, Otis elevator, Pratt & Whitney engines, and Sikorsky
helicopters.157
Conglomerates also continue to flourish among closely-held
companies or public companies with controlling shareholders. An

154 See Ted Mann & Erin McCarthy, GE Plans to Divest More Businesses; Profit,
Revenue
Decline,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Apr.
17,
2004,
4:31
PM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303626804579505381599450134
[http://perma.cc/Z7N4-X4FW].
155 JoAnn S. Lublin, et al., GE Seeks Exit from Banking Business, WALL ST. J.
(Apr. 10, 2015, 6:31 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ge-prepared-to-exit-the-bulkof-ge-capital-1428662109 [http://perma.cc/U28W-75R7]; Justin Fox, Is GE Capital A
Dodd-Frank
Victim?,
BLOOMBERG
(Apr.
10,
2015,
2:50
PM),
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-04-10/ge-blazes-a-path-for-thefinancial-giants-to-follow [http://perma.cc/MVF6-S2FM].
156 See Mann & McCarthy, supra note 154.
157 See
Our Businesses At a Glance, UNITED TECHNOLOGIES,
http://www.utc.com/Our-Businesses/Pages/At-A-Glance.aspx [http://perma.cc/UR9KCJX2]. Yet another example is Honeywell International Inc. See Ted Mann,
Conglomerate Honeywell Finds Love Amid the Breakups, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 2, 2015,
12:53 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/conglomerate-honeywell-finds-love-amidthe-breakups-1441156184 [http://perma.cc/4C7S-5STK].
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example of the latter is Danaher, a Fortune 500 company run by
Mitchell and Steven Rales operating in numerous sectors, including
dental equipment, life sciences, environmental technologies, industrial
tools, and precision instruments. Among closely-held conglomerates,
an exemplar is the Marmon Group, a classic and massive conglomerate
built by Jay and Bob Pritzker during the conglomerate boom and
afterwards—and acquired by Berkshire in 2006.
Today, an entire sector is reviving the conglomerate model, led by
technology behemoths such as Amazon, Facebook, and Google. The
movement is epitomized by the conscious decision of Google to
reorganize as Alphabet to arrange the growing diversity of its
businesses.158 Generating abundant cash from its primary search
business, Google has expanded into many fields, although they pivot
around highly-innovative technology: Android, Chrome, Nest,
YouTube, and the driverless car business. Google is consciously
mimicking Berkshire in adopting an autonomous, decentralized, and
trust-based organizational model, and its origins resemble those of
General Electric. A century ago, GE’s leadership viewed electricity the
way Google’s leadership sees technology: as a transformative force
driving pervasive change in commerce, education, home life, and
society at large.159
Berkshire—along with such companies as Danaher, General
Electric, and United Technologies—proved that the conglomerate
model can succeed when based on principles such as autonomy and
permanence—the practice of acquiring diverse high-quality businesses
and then nurturing and retaining them through thick and thin. Google—
along with the likes of Amazon and Facebook—has the opportunity to
Compare Tim Mullaney, The True Mastermind of Google’s Alphabet? Warren
Buffett,
MARKETWATCH
(Aug.
17,
2015,
6:01
AM),
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/the-true-mastermind-of-googles-alphabet-warrenbuffett-2015-08-17 [http://perma.cc/FJ4X-62MH], with Max Nisen, No, Alphabet
Structure is Really Nothing Like Berkshire Hathaway, QUARTZ (Aug. 13, 2015),
http://qz.com/477284/no-googles-new-alphabet-structure-is-really-nothing-likeberkshire-hathaway/ [http://perma.cc/2WM8-XQAT].
159 See Steve Jordon, Are Conglomerates Making a Comeback? Berkshire
Hathaway’s Business Model May Be Back in Fashion, OMAHA WORLD HERALD (Aug.
21, 2015, 12:30 AM), http://www.omaha.com/money/are-conglomerates-making-acomeback-berkshire-hathaway-s-business-model/article_a98b99a2-acca-5a89-9108470d46a3fca8.html [http://perma.cc/2UGE-BQHM].
158
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extend the proof and the lessons. The lesson from Berkshire for such
emulators is not only that the model can work, but to expose some of
the challenges and blemishes that must be either addressed or tolerated.

C. Activism, Hostility and Defense
Long before the era of the conglomerate, during the period
examined in the classic text by Berle and Means, corporations were
thought of as perpetual—enduring institutions such as Berkshire.160 But
as the conglomerate era was eclipsed by the takeover era, corporations
became more transient, in perception and fact.161 Transience is today’s
prevailing mindset too, sustained by those committed to pressuring
corporations to deliver immediate shareholder results, whether it is
shareholder activists, hedge funds, or private equity firms. The latter
approach acquisitions very differently than Berkshire: they are highly
leveraged, deeply interventionist, heavily intermediated, and short-term
by design.162
Conglomerates, therefore, remain out of fashion, primed to attract
hostility requiring strong defenses. While the best defense is solid and
sustained economic performance, another advantage—shared by
Berkshire as well as Danaher and Google—is large block
shareholdings.163 No raider during the heyday of the hostile takeover
and no shareholder activist today would consider targeting Berkshire.164
Indeed, Buffett famously aligned with the defenders of corporate
bastions during the 1980’s hostile takeover wave, as Berkshire provided
takeover defense to companies such as Gillette by acquiring substantial
convertible preferred stock and, in the case of Scott Fetzer, acquired the
entire company as a white knight to defeat a hostile bid.165
160

See Gerald F. Davis, The Twilight of the Berle and Means Corporation, 34
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1121, 1124, 1133–34 (2011).
161 See, e.g., Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 COLUM.
L. REV. 1931 (1991).
162 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Intermediary Influence and Competition:
Berkshire Versus KKR, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 177, 181, 187–89 (2015).
163 See Deborah A. DeMott, Agency Principles and Large Block Shareholders, 19
CARDOZO L. REV 321, 321, 334 (1997).
164 See CUNNINGHAM, BERKSHIRE BEYOND BUFFETT, supra note 6, at 198–99, 203,
210.
165 Lawrence A. Cunningham, Warren Buffett and Wall Street: The Best of
Frenemies, FINANCIAL HISTORY 16, 17 (Fall 2015).
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But the calculus may differ after Buffett departs from the scene.
After all, despite a market capitalization of nearly a half-trillion dollars,
many analysts calculate that Berkshire is worth more—that the sum of
the parts is greater than the whole and certainly substantial multiples of
book value.166 Indeed, Berkshire invariably recovers its purchase price
on acquisitions and investments rapidly, amid rising economic
goodwill, while recording acquisitions at cost less depreciation, driving
a huge wedge between intrinsic value and book value.167
Citing criticisms of the conglomerate business model, activists will
urge Buffett’s successors to sell Berkshire’s struggling units, spin-off
the mediocre ones, and install new managers at some.168 In the process,
activists would call for distributing cash to shareholders. They would
explain how the net effect of such sales and distributions would increase
immediate value for shareholders.
The counterargument will stress the long-term value for Berkshire
shareholders of ironclad pledges to business sellers of a permanent
home offering managerial autonomy and an environment in which vast
amounts of capital can be moved from one subsidiary to another without
taxes or transaction fees.169 The economic value of such commitments
and flexibility is not necessarily reflected in Berkshire’s prevailing
stock price or the valuations of individual subsidiaries. The premium
may only manifest itself when Berkshire makes an acquisition and be
preserved only by sustaining the conglomerate.

166 See, e.g., Drew Woodbury & Greggory Warren, What’s the Best Way to Value
Berkshire
Valuation,
MORNINGSTAR,
at
13–21.
(Feb.
19,
2013),
http://msi.morningstar.com/Image/BRKvaluation.pdf [http://perma.cc/LA83-9AD3].
Separately value and sum the major components of Berkshire and compare the result to
the company’s market capitalization: BH Energy, BNFS, the three principal insurance
companies (Gen Re, GEICO, National Indemnity), the finance companies (led by
Clayton Homes), the vast manufacturing and services operations, and the portfolio of
investments (alone worth at least $120 billion).
167 See THE ESSAYS OF WARREN BUFFETT, supra note 14, at 226–47.
168 See CUNNINGHAM, BERKSHIRE BEYOND BUFFETT, supra note 6, at 208, 218–
20. For a taste of such advocacy, see Life After Warren, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 16,
2014,
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21601255-all-his-success-buildinggreat-corporation-warren-buffett-should-now-contemplate
[https://perma.cc/P2D5JMN4].
169 CUNNINGHAM, BERKSHIRE BEYOND BUFFETT, supra note 6, at 195–96, 218–20.
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Beyond the merits of such a debate, the defenses available to a
corporation facing such activism will assume some importance,
meaning that the Berkshire model may also offer lessons about the
market for corporate control—the world of takeovers. Berkshire’s
corporate governance insulates it from activist shareholder agitation,
starting with its dual class capital structure. Such structures are
controversial if adopted as a takeover defense when they coerce
stockholders to choose liquidity in exchange for surrendering control or
in general because of the disparity between economic and voting rights.
But Berkshire’s structure was adopted two decades ago to protect
its shareholders by deterring intermediaries from creating trusts
hawking fractional interests in the stock.170 Still, the Class A shares—
where Buffett and other long-time owners hold most of their stakes—
command a significant multiple of the vote compared to the Class B
shares.171 After Buffett’s death, his bloc, currently at 34 percent of the
vote, will be gradually sold over as many as ten years, providing his
legatees with enduring though incrementally waning control.172
Berkshire’s charter provides for the annual election of every
board seat, making it theoretically possible for an insurgent to gain
control of a majority in a single year. To check that, consideration might
be given now to amending the charter, by board and shareholder vote,
to opt for a staggered board with three classes of directors each serving
three-year terms. That would promote continuity and independence
while demanding greater patience from activists. It would also be a
controversial move, however, as the recent debate over classified
boards drew impassioned views on the subject.173 Berkshire has never
170 See Robert W. Hamilton, Reflections on the Pricing of Shares, 19 CARDOZO L.
REV. 493, 500, 503 (1997).
171 Today, Class A shares have one vote per share and an equivalent claim to the
economic interest such as dividends while the Class B shares have 1/10,000 of that
voting power and 1/1,500 of that economic interest. Recent stock market prices have
been $200,000 for Class A shares and $130 Class B shares.
172 See CUNNINGHAM, BERKSHIRE BEYOND BUFFETT, supra note 6, at 193–210.
173 See Brian Baxter, Spat Over Staggered Corporate Boards Pits Wachtell
Against Harvard’s Bebchuk, AM. L. DAILY (Mar. 21, 2012, 7:00 PM),
http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2012/03/wachtell-harvardshareholder.html [http://perma.cc/P434-GFW3] (noting duel between Lucian Bebchuk
advocating for widespread repeal of classified boards and Martin Lipton vigorously
opposing the campaign).
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had, but has never needed, a classified board; its culture and history are
congruent with a classified board.174

D. Emulation
Many people are interested in replicating Berkshire Hathaway, from
the current leadership of Google to smaller insurance companies such
as Markel Corporation, which has consciously mimicked the model
quite successfully on a lesser scale. Many Berkshire subsidiaries are
themselves conglomerates, genuine mini-Berkshires including not only
Marmon and Scott Fetzer but Berkshire Hathaway Energy, MiTek, and
Precision Cast Parts. Business people dream of creating conglomerates
in Berkshire’s image in much the same way proverbial literary types
want to write the next best-selling novel. And it can be done, if not on
the same scale or to the same degree. More modest aspirations would
emulate some of Berkshire’s principles and practices, especially those
of autonomy, decentralization, permanence, self-reliance, and trust.
Adapting the Berkshire model can create a competitive advantage
versus rivals in the acquisition market, from strategic buyers to private
equity firms. GE, for example, cannot offer autonomy or permanence.
It is very acquisitive, but nearly as prone to divestitures—former CEO
Jack Welch became famous for closing or selling any subsidiary that
failed to lead its industry and Jeff Immelt executed a significant
divestiture program. Private equity firms are interventionist by strategy
and short term by design. They create funds with ten-year lives (five to
sow then five to reap) and immediately alter target managers, cultures,
workforces and production facilities to prepare the company for
resale.175
Above all and for every public company, the most important lesson
from Berkshire is the value of a long-term outlook. When public
company managers are hounded by analysts and activist shareholders

174 Another tool to consider: a charter amendment providing that all director
nominations are to be made by the incumbent board rather than through the fashionable
alternative that lets shareholders adopt bylaws requiring the corporation to let certain
large and longer-term shareholders nominate directors.
175 See, e.g., DAVID CAREY & JOHN E. MORRIS, KING OF CAPITAL: THE
REMARKABLE RISE, FALL, AND RISE AGAIN OF STEVE SCHWARZMAN AND BLACKSTONE
(2010).
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about results in the current quarter and year-to-date, the pressure to
focus on the short-term is intense. Cutting costs today and maximizing
revenue now easily entail a sacrifice in future economic gain. The gains
from withstanding short-term pressure to focus on results over the
coming several years compound over time. The best emulators of
Berkshire are companies and managers who earn reputations for serious
long-term focus by achieving high average annual returns over rolling
periods of five and ten years. That can be done in many different ways,
using a variety of board structures, management techniques, and
corporate cultures—all of which have costs as well as benefits and of
which many varieties should be allowed to flourish.

IV. CONCLUSION
People often say one’s best quality is also one’s worst quality and
the same goes for Buffett and the Berkshire model he minted. It’s been
a huge plus for him to control investments and acquisitions, hire
managers and give them autonomy in a decentralized structure—and
those are the source of substantially all the costs of the Berkshire model
as well. For others certainly, and maybe even for Buffett, easing up on
the model in favor of a degree of the more conventional approaches
might reduce some costs while sacrificing less in the way of gains.
There’s no reason to second-guess Buffett but every reason to believe
that his successors will be drawn to making some adjustments.
But Berkshire and other companies should be permitted to devise
the governance and organizational structures that work for them,
whether the advisory or monitoring board, powerful or constrained
executives, trust or control based cultures, and concentrated or
diversified business organizations. While even Berkshire can improve,
it shows that, warts and all, the conventional wisdom in corporate
governance and practice is not always efficient or wise.

